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Individuals living in developing economies are subject to a wide variety
of risks. Moreover, since private and public formal institutions designed to
help individuals coping with risks tend to be weaker and narrower than in
rich countries, these risks very often bear a heavy burden on welfare. If
the preferences of agents can be characterized by concave utility functions,
these agents will want to spread risk across time and among themselves. We
focus here on mechanisms allowing agents to share risk among themselves,
and we look more particularly at environments where formal insurance op-
tions are incomplete or absent. This thesis oﬀers three chapters which goal
is to analyze the extent to which risk sharing is aﬀected by imperfections
in the insurance or in the credit markets. In the ﬁrst two chapters, we take
a microeconomic perspective and we examine how rural farmers cope with
income shocks in village economies characterized by the absence of formal
insurance markets. In the last chapter, we adopt a macroeconomic perspec-
tive and we look at the role of the domestic ﬁnancial sector development
in fostering risk sharing through ﬁnancial integration between countries.
At the microeconomic level, households have relied on informal ways to
minimize their exposure to risk and to mitigate the inﬂuence of shocks on
their welfare when domestic ﬁnancial institutions are not suﬃciently devel-
oped to deliver eﬃcient pooling of risks. One way through which risk can
be pooled in these environment is through informal tranfers or reciprocated
gifts. This channel has been investigated in the anthropological literature
by Cashdan (1985) in Northern Botswana, and in development economics
with the studies of Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) and Cox (2002). In chap-
ter 1, we build on this work to examine whether inter-household private
3
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transfers play an insurance role in rural Vietnam. We look at household
survey data collected in 1993 and in 1998 to analyze transfer ﬂows, fo-
cusing particularly on the relationship between transfer partners and their
geographical location. We ﬁnd that transfer ﬂows do respond to both in-
come and life-cycle shocks at the household level, but this informal insur-
ance occurs essentially within the family network. Moreover, these transfer
patterns are consistent with a simple risk-sharing model where contracts
cannot be enforced, and where altruism helps increasing the scope for in-
surance possibilities.
Informal transfers are however not the only possible mechanism on
which rural households can rely to cope with realized income shocks. Fol-
lowing the work of Townsend (1994) and of Deaton (1997) in developing
countries, we adopt another approach which consists in looking at the out-
come of informal risk sharing in terms of consumption instead of focusing
on the speciﬁc channels throught which this pooling of risks is achieved. In
chapter 2, using the same data, we assess the eﬀectiveness of informal risk
sharing arrangements in protecting household consumption from idiosyn-
cratic income shocks. We ﬁnd that households consumption allocations
are consistent with optimal risk sharing taking place at the commune level
under limited contract enforceability.
At the macroeconomic level, international ﬁnancial integration should
also in theory allow countries to pool idiosyncratic risks. However, a series
of ﬁnancial crises taking place during the 1990’s has shown that ﬁnancial
integration is not without risk for the stability of aggregate consumption.
In chapter 3 we focus on the inﬂuence of domestic ﬁnancial development in
the relationship between ﬁnancial integration and macroeconomic volatil-
ity. Looking at a panel of 90 countries over the period 1960-2000, we ﬁnd
that consumption growth volatility increases with the degree of ﬁnancial
integration in countries with low level of ﬁnancial development and it de-
creases in countries with high level of ﬁnancial development.
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Transfers and Insurance Among Vietnamese Families
1.1. Introduction
In a country like Vietnam, rural households are exposed to a wide range
of risks, most of which directly aﬀect their main income generating activ-
ity. If these households are risk averse, they will want to insure themselves
against income ﬂuctuations one way or another. As in many other develop-
ing economies though, formal insurance against these risks, whether private
or public-based, is often lacking or incomplete. If formal insurance mech-
anisms are absent, there exists nonetheless a variety of informal strategies
allowing households to either reduce their exposure to risks or to cope with
shocks once they have occured (see Alderman and Paxson (1992), Morduch
(1999), or Fafchamps (2003) for reviews of this literature).
One possible way by which risk sharing could take place is through in-
formal transfer arrangements in which risk-averse agents agree ex-ante to
deliver ex-post a state contingent payment when hit by diﬀerent idiosyn-
cratic shocks. When contracts are not enforceable ex-post however, the
scope for risk sharing diminishes and full insurance is often not achievable.
Cox (2002) analyzes the patterns of inter-household transfers in Vietnam
during the 1990’s and concludes that these transfers are frequent and impor-
tant. We extend this descriptive analysis by asking whether these transfers
serve as a vehicle for risk sharing in rural Vietnam.
The standard conceptual framework in the literature related to trans-
fers has distinguished three major possible determinants of transfers: al-
truism, pure exchange motives and risk sharing motives (see for example
Becker (1974), Cox (1987), Cox et al. (2004), Kazianga (2006)). Another
5
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approach initiated by Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) analyzes transfer be-
havior by explicitly accounting for limited commitment issues inherent to
informal risk sharing arrangements. Using panel data from rural India and
rural Pakistan, they analyze how the degree of altruism aﬀects the shape of
risk sharing arrangements when contracts are not perfectly enforceable. To
do so, they introduce altruistic agents in the model of risk sharing under
limited commitment of Thomas and Worrall (1997). If altruism has no ob-
vious role to play in determining risk sharing arrangements when contracts
are perfectly enforceable, the situation is diﬀerent when the incentives to
deviate from an agreement exist. In that case, the scope for risk sharing
between selﬁsh agents should decrease substantially, but altruism could in
principle increase the possibility of risk sharing within kins.
In this paper, we follow this approach and we use household survey data
from Vietnam conducted in 1993 and 1998 to study the determinants of pri-
vate transfers between rural households. Transfers are large and widespread
among Vietnamese families during this period and, most importantly, they
often take place within the family circle (see ﬁgures 8 and 9). This is why we
believe that altruism is an important motive for transfers in rural Vietnam.
We ask whether inter-household private transfers play an insurance role for
Vietnamese families and, if it does, to what extent are these arrangements
inﬂuenced by limited commitment problems.
The paper is organized as follows. Following Foster and Rosenzweig
(2001), section 2 presents a conceptual framework for private transfers be-
tween altruistic agents in an environment where contracts are not perfectly
enforceable. The empirical approach and the data are described in sections
3 and 4, and the results are presented in sections 5 and 6. Sections 7 and
8 discuss the results and conclude.
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1.2. Transfers, Altruism and Limited Commitment
The model has two agents i = 1;2 who care about each other in the
sense that their single-period utility function depends positively on the
other agent’s utility:
(1.1) U1 = u(c1) + v (c2);
(1.2) V2 = v (c2) + u(c1):
The two agents receive a stochastic endowment yi (st) in each period,
where st denotes the state of nature at date t. States of nature follow
a Markov process with probability of transition sr from state s to state
r. There is no possibility of saving across periods. Both u() and v ()
are increasing and concave and the degree of altruism is captured by the
parameter , with  2 (0;1).
Risk-averse agents will be better-oﬀ sharing the idiosyncratic shocks
on their endowment. One way to model risk sharing possibilities here is
to allow agents to send transfers to each other conditional on the realized
state of the world and on the past history of events. In this model, con-
tracts are not legally enforceable, so the agents compare at every period t
the beneﬁts of sticking to their informal agreements made in the previous
periods to the beneﬁts of deviating from it. We assume that the cost of
deviating once from an informal arrangement is to revert to a sequence of
static Nash equilibria. The nature of this Nash equilibrium depends on the
degree of altruism between the partners: for low levels of altruism both
agents operate under autarchy, but at higher levels, partial risk sharing is
still possible. As such, altruism inﬂuences risk-sharing arrangements in an
ambiguous way: on one hand, since an agent’s utility depends positively on
the other agent’s utility, altruism directly increases the likelihood of trans-
fers when agents are hit by diﬀerent shocks; on the other hand, because it
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also reduces the credibility of the reversion to autarchy, it diminishes the
ability to sanction deviations from the agreements.
In that environment, the set of feasible contracts can be characterized
by a transfer function  (ht) that speciﬁes a transfer ﬂow from agent 1 to
agent 2 in period t after history ht where ht = fs1;s2;:::;stg. If agent 1
receives a transfer, this amount is negative.
First, the transfer function for the static Nash equilibrium given state
st can be characterized as follows:
 If agent 1 is better-oﬀ than agent 2 to the point that his marginal
utility of consumption is lower than the weighted marginal utility
of his partner (where the weight is the altruism parameter ), i.e.
u
0
(y1 (st)) < v
0
(y2 (st));
then agent 1 will transfer a positive amount TRN to agent 2 (out
of pure altruism,  > 0) so that after transfers, agent 1’s marginal
utility is equal to the weighted marginal utility of his partner.
(1.3) u
0  









 Conversely, if agent 1 is worse-oﬀ than agent 2 to the point that
his weighted marginal utility (from the perspective of agent 2) is
higher than his partner’s marginal utility, i.e.
v
0
(y2 (st)) < u
0
(y1 (st));
then agent 1 will transfer a negative amount TRN to agent 2 so that













 TRN = 0 otherwise, i.e. no transfer takes place.
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Now we can deﬁne for agent 1 the expected discounted utility gain from
the risk-sharing arrangement with respect to the sequence of static Nash
equilibria deﬁned above as:































where  is the time discount factor. This is just the present value
diﬀerence between the expected utility of enforcing the contract and the
expected utility of deviating from it. The ﬁrst two lines represent the
immediate gain from the contract while the last two lines describe the
continuation gain of participating in the arrangement. We can write a
similar expression V (ht) for agent 2.
In this environment, since contracts are not legally enforceable, any
feasible contract has to satisfy the following implementability constraints:
U (ht)  0
and
V (ht)  0
for each history ht. In other words, the informal risk sharing arrangements
are enforced only inasmuch as the expected utility of maintaining the ar-
rangement is higher, given history ht, than the expected utility of deviating
from it. These conditions deﬁne a set of sustainable contracts, among which
lies the set of constrained-eﬃcient contracts.
Next, Vs (Us) can be deﬁned as the Pareto frontier which maximizes
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household 2’s expected discounted utility for the realized state of nature
s at date t, given that household 1 enjoys at least U (st). The Markov
assumption implies that the problem is recursive. Moreover, since any
eﬃcient contract must have an eﬃcient continuation contract, the imple-
mentability constraints outlined above depend only on the current state
of nature. Therefore, the Pareto frontier too depends only on the current
state s and not on the past history1. The Pareto frontier Vs (Us) can thus
be deﬁned as:





























srr : Ur  0
srr : Vr (Ur)  0
 1 : y1 (s)   TRs  0
 2 : y2 (s) + TRs  0:
The ﬁrst order conditions and the envelope condition for this problem
are:
v
0 (y2 (s) + TRs) + u
0 (y1 (s)   TRs)
u
0 (y1 (s)   TRs) + v
0 (y2 (s) + TRs)
=  +
 1    2
u
0 (y1 (s)   TRs) + v









The slope of the Pareto frontier for which both agents equalize their
marginal utility is given by  . More speciﬁcally, for each state s there is
1See Thomas and Worrall (1988) and Thomas and Worrall (1997).
Hoang-Vu Eozenou, Patrick (2010), Essays on Risk-Sharing and Development 
European University Institute 
 
DOI: 10.2870/182151.2. TRANSFERS, ALTRUISM AND LIMITED COMMITMENT 11








> > > <
> > > :
s if (ht) < s




s if (ht) > s
9
> > > =
> > > ;
The dynamics of the optimal implementable contract can be described
as follows. The agents ﬁrst agree on a distribution of current and future
resources given the current state of the world. This allocation corresponds
to a point on the Pareto frontier Vs (U). The negative of the slope of the
Pareto frontier at this point deﬁnes a ratio of single period marginal utilities
0 that the agents are willing to maintain in the next period. When the next
period unfolds, and as long as the implementability constraints are satisﬁed
for both agents, transfers take place in order to maintain marginal utilities
at 0. When an implementability constraint binds, however, i.e when the
better-oﬀ agent would prefer to deviate and revert to the sequence of static
Nash equilibria, the current resource allocation is adjusted together with
the continuation payoﬀ just as much as to satisfy the implementability
constraints for both agents. A new ratio of marginal utilities 1 is thus
deﬁned and maintained until another implementability constraint binds
again.
In comparison to this, the ﬁrst-best contract is a stationary contract
and is deﬁned such that  = 1 at all points in time. When contracts
are perfectly enforceable, then the agents can just pool their endowment
together and divide it equally amongst them at every period. If contracts
are not enforced ex-post, however, the better-oﬀ household can sometimes
prefer to walk away from the arrangement made in the previous period, keep
his high endowment for himself and remain in the static Nash equilibrium
for the following periods. In these cases, what the optimal implementable
contract does is to change the repartition rule in favor of the better-oﬀ
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agent just enough as to prevent him of deviating from the risk-sharing
arrangement.
Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) resort to numerical simulations to derive
qualitative implications for the shape of the optimal contract by varying
the degree of altruism, imperfect commitment and also income covariance.
A key prediction of this model is that when contracts are not enforceable
ex-post, current transfers should depend on past transfers. When limited
commitment is not an issue, however, full risk sharing is possible, and the
implementability constraints never bind. In this case, current transfers are
not history dependent.
Assuming that altruism is greater among family members, the above
model has interesting implications for the determination of transfers within
and between families. If limited commitment matters in the design of
informal insurance contracts, then, holding the level of income correlation
between transfer partners constant, families are expected to play a more
important role in the provision of insurance.
1.3. Estimation Strategy
An exact representation of the relationship between current shocks, past
history and current transfers would require information that is usually not
available in typical survey data (such as the joint distribution of income for
the two agents). An alternative and simpler approach suggested by Foster
and Rosenzweig (2001) starts with a linear approximation of the transfer
function. They use simulated data from the model to carry regression
analysis and to derive speciﬁc predictions on the coeﬃcients of the linearized
transfer function. These estimates are compared with those obtained from
survey data using the same speciﬁcation and estimation procedure. We
follow the same approach here.
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Equation (1.6) can be solved for TR and then linearized. A measure of






The linear approximation of the transfer function can then be written
as
(1.9) TRit = 0 + 1Tit + 2yit + 3y it;
where y it is the income of the transfer partner and TRit is the net
transfer amount received by agent i from its partners. Usually, however,
the income of the transfer partner y it and the complete history of transfers
up to time t are not observed. One way to address this issue is to assume
ﬁrst that income can be decomposed into a ﬁxed anticipated part and an
unanticipated i.i.d part: yit = yi + it. Then, we need also to assume that
the correlation between the transfer partners error term  can be written
such that  it = it+u it. Finally, by substituting these terms and taking
the ﬁrst diﬀerence of equation (1.9), we have the following reduced form
(1.10) 4TRit = 1TRit + 44it + 34u it;
where 4 is a (forward) ﬁrst diﬀerence operator and 4 = 2 + 3.
Observations for at least 2 periods are now needed to estimate (1.10). In
the case of symmetric transfer arrangements (3 =  2), if partners income
are not perfectly correlated ( < 1), then sgn(4) = sgn(3).
Note that these reduced form estimates will suﬀer from a potential
endogeneity bias. First, lagged transfers appear both in the dependent
variable 4TRit and on the right hand side of (1.10). Second, endogeneity
could arise because of measurement error in agent i’s income, and ﬁnally,
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because the unobserved partner’s income shock u it is likely to be correlated
with the current transfer level of i. To address endogeneity issues we use
instruments for all the potentially endogenous right hand side variables.
More speciﬁcally, we include inherited land holdings, interacted with past
natural disaster shocks in our set of instruments. We assume that these
are orthogonal to u it. A history of natural disaster shocks in the ﬁve
year preceding the ﬁrst survey round was recorded at the commune level.
Besides, we take that inherited land holdings (dry and irrigated) reﬂect the
initial asset position of rural households. The interaction of inherited land
holdings with a ﬁve year history of natural disasters shocks should thus
be a relevant predictor for the transfer asset stock at the begining of the
survey period. Moreover, inherited land holdings interacted with natural
disaster shocks between 1993 and 1997 should form reasonable instruments
for income shocks experienced between the two survey rounds.
Using simulated data from their model and the above estimation frame-
work, Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) derive a set of testable predictions for
the patterns of private transfers between altruistically related agents in an
environment where commitment is limited. We will compare the shape of
private transfers in Vietnam against the following predictions:
 [P1] If risk sharing is a motive driving inter-household private
transfers, then positive income shocks should be associated with a
reduction in received transfers, so 4 < 0.
 [P2] Even in the presence of high degree of altruism between part-
ners, risk-sharing arrangements can be restricted because of com-
mitment problems. This restriction will be translated in the data
through a certain degree of negative history dependence in current
transfers. Holding income correlation between partners constant,
individuals who received assistance in the past are less likely to re-
ceive transfers in the current period compared to individuals who
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did not receive assistance in the past. This means that when com-
mitment constraints are binding, 1 < 0.
 [P3] Both for family and non-family partners, transfers should be
more sensitive to income shocks the lower the degree of income
correlation between partners.
 [P4] For similar degrees of income correlation between partners,
transfers should be more responsive to shock and less history de-
pendent when altruism is higher.
 [P5] When the degree of altruism between partners is suﬃciently
high, history dependence is higher when income correlation is higher.
Because it contains relatively detailed and disaggregated information on
the origin of transfers received and on the destination of transfers sent, the
panel dataset from the Vietnam Living Standard Survey (VLSS) conducted
in 1993 and in 1998 allows us to test the main predictions of the Foster and
Rosenzweig (2001) model. In their paper, Foster and Rosenzweig showed
that the main predictions of the model are supported by the ICRISAT Vil-
lage Level Studies (VLS) from India. Our work is complementary to theirs
to the extent that we use a dataset that diﬀers substantially in dimension
to the Indian data: the ICRISAT data covers 6 villages and 207 house-
holds over up to 10 years while the VLSS covers 156 communes and 4305
households over 2 time periods.
1.4. Transfers in the Vietnam Living Standard Survey
This section presents the dataset and the variables of interest, together
with a descriptive overview of the patterns of transfers in Vietnam between
1993 and 1998.
1.4.1. The Vietnam Living Standard Survey. The VLSS was de-
signed to provide nationally representative data on household living stan-
dards to be used in policy design, monitoring of living standards and evalu-
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ation of policies and programs. The basic sample frame was obtained from
the 1989 Population Census from which 4,799 households were sampled in
1993. This sample was chosen to be representative of the whole popula-
tion and self-weighting. In 1998, over 1,500 households were added to the
initial sample and a total of 4,305 households were re-surveyed, providing
a relatively large sample but with a short time dimension. Information
was collected both at the commune and household level, covering areas
such as health, education, employment activities, agricultural production,
non-farm business, asset ownership and transfers.
We focus here on households interviewed in the two survey rounds and
living in rural areas because commune level information was collected in
rural areas only. This constitutes a panel of 3465 households interviewed
both in 1993 and in 1998. Table 1, 2a and 2b present some summary
characteristics for our sample. Households in our sample are distributed
across 120 communes and in 7 administrative regions2.
The VLSS does not provide direct calculations of household income,
but detailed information on the sources of income is available and allows
us to estimate household real income for the whole sample in both years.
Nominal income is corrected in both years for monthly and regional price
variations. Moreover we express income from 1993 in 1998 terms3. From the
survey information, total income can be disaggregated into 5 components:
(1) income from land payments, (2) income from agricultural activities, (3)
non-farm self-employment income, (4) wage income, and (5) other income
(including public and private transfers). The details concerning these broad
income components are given in Appendix 1.
Income estimates obtained by aggregating these various components
are in line with the estimated total consumption expenditures given by the
2Communes are the basic local level administrative unit, and each commune has a num-
ber of villages from which households were sampled (on average 2 villages were selected
in every commune).
3In 1998, the exchange rate between VND and USD was approximately 13,900 VND for
1 USD.
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survey (table 1). We focus more speciﬁcally on pre-transfer income, which is
total income plus transfers sent to other households minus transfers received
from other households. Between 1993 and 1998, pre-transfer income grew
at an annual rate of 9% while total consumption per capita grew at an
annual rate of 8%.
The structure of income for our sample of rural households is represented
in ﬁgures 2 and 3. The main component of rural households’ income is
derived from agricultural activities. Figure 1 and table 2 show the regional
repartition of income in 1993 and 1998. Southern regions grew more rapidly
than northern regions4.
1.4.2. Inter-Household Transfers in 1993 and in 1998. Our fo-
cus is on transfers deﬁned as any amount of money or the real value of goods
received (sent) from (to) individuals who are not members of the house-
hold but who resided in Vietnam during the past 12 months preceding the
interview.
A noticeable feature of transfer patterns in rural Vietnam is that de-
spite rapid economic growth between 1993 and 1998, transfers remained
relatively important. The percentage of rural households participating in
transfer activities (receiving transfers, sending transfers or both) is rela-
tively high in both years, and it actually increased from 24% in 1993 to
33% in 1998 (table 3). This increase in the transfer participation rate was
also noted by Cox (2002) who looked at the whole VLSS sample and re-
ported and increase in the participation rate from 35% in 1993 to 39% in
1998. Not only participation in transfer activities increased between 1993
and 1998, but so did the magnitude of transfers, both in absolute and in
relative terms (table 4). The amounts of transfers received were already
relatively important in proportion to receivers pre-transfer income in 1993
(16.3%), and in the second round of the survey this ratio was close to 20%.
4In the ﬁgures and in the tables, regions from left to right correspond to regions from
North to South.
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We notice a similar trend for transfers out. These represented 5% of net
senders pre-transfer income in 1993 and 8% in 1998.
Furthermore, transfers in rural Vietnam seem to ﬂow from richer to
poorer households (table 5). In both rounds of the survey, net senders
income before transfers was close to twice the level of income for net re-
ceivers, and this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at a 99% conﬁdence
level. Moreover, comparing the age distribution of household heads accord-
ing to their transfer status, we observe that net senders are predominantly
in the active age range while net receivers are not. The age distribution
of household heads for net receivers is clearly bimodal in both years of the
survey, with a mode at the early stage of active life and the other mode
at retirement age (see ﬁgure 4). This suggests that among the many po-
tential motives underlying transfer ﬂows in rural Vietnam, redistribution
is an important one, both from the richest to the poorest and from the
economically active to the non-active.
An interesting characteristic of the VLSS data on transfers is that some
information about the transfer partners is available (such as their relation-
ship and their geographical location at the province level5. This allows us to
look at the geography of transfer ﬂows in rural Vietnam. A non-negligible
amount of inter-household transfers occurs outside the local vicinity. While
63-65% of the transfers take place within the same province in 1998, the
percentage of transfers involving partners located in diﬀerent regions is
around 51-54% (table 6). Looking now at the relationship between trans-
fer partners, we note that a large majority of transfer ﬂows involves family
members, most of which are close family members. Between 1993 and 1998,
the proportion of transfers taking place outside the family circle remains
more or less the same (3-5%) while the proportion of transfers involving
extended family members increase from about 20% to about 30% (ﬁgures
8 and 9).
5Unfortunately, this information is not available at the village nor at the commune level.
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Overall, the VLSS dataset appears particularly suited to serve as a
basis to analyze risk sharing through inter-household transfers. Transfers
are frequent and important, and they involve partners experiencing diﬀer-
ent degrees of income correlation. Moreover, if risk sharing takes place
through transfers, the information relative to the relationship of the trans-
fer partners will allow us to investigate the role of altruism in determining
the shape of the risk sharing arrangements.
1.5. Empirical Analysis
Having the model presented in section 2 in mind, we use the information
available in the VLSS to assess whether transfers provide some insurance
against income shocks in rural Vietnam. Then, we examine whether risk
sharing through transfers is somehow constrained by limited commitment.
Finally, we also attempt to determine whether altruism plays a role in
shaping informal risk sharing arrangements.
The empirical tests are based on equation (1.9). Using a ﬁxed-eﬀects IV
regression and treating the transfer partner’s income y it as an unobserved
variable (together with the additional assumptions that yit = yi + it and
that  it = it+u it) yields the reduced form equation (1.10). Three asset
stock variables are also introduced in equation (1.9) to account for the fact
that some households in rural Vietnam have access to some form of saving
technology: the real value of livestock holdings, the real value of savings
and the real value of owned capital equipment. While the real value of
livestock holdings and of savings remained almost the same between 1993
and 1998, the value of capital equipment owned increased by 33% between
the two survey rounds (table 7).
Table 2 and ﬁgure 1 show us that the Central Highlands region experi-
enced a larger income growth compared to the other regions. This is due
to the fact that this region is specialized in the production of coﬀee (84%
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of the farmers in this region) and to the fact that world coﬀee prices in-
creased dramatically between 1993 and 1998. Since most of the farmers in
the Central Highlands were net senders, we checked the robustness of our
ﬁndings by dropping the coﬀe producers from the sample. This did not
change our results6.
Finally, we also control for insurance transfers received from the govern-
ment. The proportion of households receiving government transfers (social
insurance funds and social subsidies) is stable around 20% in both rounds
of the survey (table 1).
1.5.1. Instrumental Variables. Since income shocks it are likely to
be measured with error, we treat income shocks as endogenous in (1.10).
Inherited land holdings (irrigated and non-irrigated) at the household level,
and their interaction with natural disasters at the commune level are used as
instruments for income shocks. Moreover, because the transfer stock at the
beginning of the period is determined simultaneously with the dependent
variable, we also use inherited land holdings interacted with the history
of natural disasters as instruments for the stock of transfers. The average
surface of owned non-irrigated land in rural Vietnam remains more or less
the same between 1993 and 1998 (0.43 Ha and 0.44 Ha). The average
surface of irrigated land, however, grows from 0.32 Ha in 1993 to 0.37 Ha in
1998 (table 8). Natural disasters include droughts, pests, ﬂoods, typhoons
and any other weather related events that lead to a reduction in production
of 10% or more at the commune level. The occurrence of such events was
recorded at the commune level between 1993 and 1998, and also in the past
5 years preceding the ﬁrst round of the survey (see ﬁgure 10). Between 1988
and 1993, the number of natural disasters reported varied between 0 and
15, and in 1993 alone, half of the sampled communes reported at least one
such natural disaster in the 12 months preceding the interview. We assume
6The results are not reported here, but are available on request.
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here that the initial state variables represented by land holdings and their
interaction with past natural disasters are good predictors for TRit, but
are otherwise unrelated to 4TRit.
Moreover, the value of savings, of livestock and of capital equipment
are also treated as endogenous and we use their level at the begining of the
period as an instrument for the change between 1993 and 1998.
Our instrumental variables must satisfy two requirements: they must
be relevant (correlated with the endogenous regressors) and valid (orthog-
onal to the error term). The consequence of relying on weak instruments
is that the resulting IV estimates can be even more biased than simple
OLS estimates (Staiger and Stock (1997)). In order to assess whether our
instruments are suﬃciently relevant, we look at F   statistics and at the
partial R2 measure from the ﬁrst stage regressions (Shea (1997)). More-
over, we also run underidentiﬁcation and weak instruments tests7. The
results of these tests are reported in table 9 and in table 10. These suggest
that our regression model is not underidentiﬁed and that our instruments
are suﬃciently correlated with the endogenous regressors. Finally, table 10
also reports the results from overidentiﬁcation tests which suggest that the
model is correctly speciﬁed and that the orthogonality conditions are valid.
A last issue of concern regarding our IV estimation strategy is the poten-
tial inﬂuence of heteroskedasticity on our estimates. If heteroskedasticity
is present, standard IV estimates are still consistent but standard errors
are inconsistently estimated and this is problematic to conduct inference.
Most importantly, the identiﬁcation tests mentioned before are going to be
invalid in the presence of heteroskedasticity8. The usual approach when
facing heteroskedasticity of unknown form is to resort to the Generalized
7We used the routines ivreg2 in STATA (Baum et al. (2007))
8While the identiﬁcation tests based on Cragg and Donald (1993) depend on the validity
of the i:i:d assumption, the analog tests proposed by Kleibergen and Paap (2006) are
robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and clustering. Since heteroskedasticity
was detected in some cases (table 11), the identiﬁcation tests reported on table 10 are
derived from Kleibergen and Paap (2006).
Hoang-Vu Eozenou, Patrick (2010), Essays on Risk-Sharing and Development 
European University Institute 
 
DOI: 10.2870/182151.5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 22
Method of Moments (GMM) introduced by Hansen (1982). In the context
of IV estimation, the moment conditions are derived from the exogeneity
assumption imposed on the instrument set.
In addition to potential heteroskedasticity of unknown form, within-
group correlation of errors is likely to be an issue in the context of commune
level data. The consequences of having clustered errors are similar to those
of heteroskedasticity: GMM estimates will still be consistent, but not eﬃ-
cient. To address these issues we follow White (1980) and Arellano (1987)
who suggest estimation methods for the variance-covariance matrix of the
GMM estimator which are robust to both arbitrary heteroskedasticity and
intragroup correlation.
The Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg test is a standard proce-
dure to assess the presence of heteroskedasticity in a regression (Breusch
and Pagan (1979), Godfrey (1978), and Cook and Weisberg (1983)). This
test relies heavily on two important assumptions: (1) normally distributed
errors and, for the IV case, (2) homoskedasticity in the ﬁrst stage equations
(relating the endogenous regressors to the instruments). Koenker (1981)’s
test statistic relaxes the ﬁrst assumption and Pagan and Hall (1983) pro-
posed a test which relaxes the second assumption. The results for these
tests are resented in table 11. Depending on the distribution assumption
imposed on the errors, these tests provide conﬂicting conclusions. Assum-
ing that the errors are normally distributed the tests always reject the null
hypothesis of homoskedasticity, but relaxing this assumption almost always
results in failure to reject the null. Given that the heteroskedasticity tests
give an ambiguous conclusion, and given that we want to allow for intra-
group correlation at the commune level, we choose to estimate our model
using 2-step eﬃcient GMM estimation with cluster-robust standard errors.
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1.6. Results
Fixed eﬀects estimates are obtained with OLS after taking the ﬁrst dif-
ference of equation (1.9). We examine ﬁrst a simple version of the model
where we only control for household characteristics, past transfer history
and income shocks. Then, in order to account for the fact that rural house-
holds also have the possibility to transfer part of their consumption good
from one period to another, we augment the base model with asset stock
variables. We also include a dummy variable indicating whether the house-
hold received some form of formal insurance through public transfers (for
pension, disability, war veterans and other types of social subsidies).
The regressions are conducted with and without the instrumental vari-
ables and the results are presented in table 12 for the whole sample. Two
important results emerge here which correspond to predictions P1 and P2
(see section 1.3). First, net received transfers respond negatively to own
income shocks which is consistent with transfer ﬂows playing an insur-
ance role for rural households. Second, transfers received today do depend
negatively on transfers received in the past which suggests that informal
transfer arrangements are shaped like credit relations where past debt inﬂu-
ences current borrowings, everything else equal. This pattern also suggests
that if insurance takes place through transfers, the scope for risk sharing is
limited by binding commitment constraints. Full insurance is thus rejected
by the data because this would imply no history dependence for current
transfers.
If received transfers respond positively to negative transitory income
shocks, they also seem to respond to longer term shocks such as changes in
the household demographic structure. Households with a higher proportion
of dependent members (youngsters and elderly) are more likely to receive
assistance. Contrasting the baseline model with the augmented model (1c
and 1d in table 12), we note that the magnitude and the direction of the
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coeﬃcients for the variables of interest are preserved. In general, transfers
do not seem to depend much on the value of assets held by rural house-
holds. The only exception to this is savings which inﬂuence positively the
amount of transfers received. Looking also at formal transfers, it seems
that public subsidies are indeed substitutes to informal transfers. However,
the coeﬃcient for this variable is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The model considered in section 1.2 implies that transfer ﬂows should
vary according to the degree of altruism and to the degree of income corre-
lation between partners. We cannot directly observe these parameters from
our data, but we can use the fact that we have some information concerning
the geographical location and the relationship of the transfer partners to
confront the model’s predictions to the data. For that, we need to make
two additional assumptions. First, we assume that the degree of altruism
is higher among close-family members than among non-family members or
among extended-family members
9. Second, we take that income correlation
is higher within provinces than across provinces. This allows us to look at
the role of altruism and of income correlation in shaping informal trans-
fers. When splitting the transfers according to location or relation between
partners, we include only the lagged transfer stock for each speciﬁc kind of
transfers
10.
Columns (2) and (3) of table 13 present estimation results distinguish-
ing between family and non-family transfers respectively. While transfer
ﬂows provide some insurance among family members, these transfers do
not respond to transitory income shocks when we look at transfers taking
place outside the family circle. This is consistent with the model outlined
9As suggested by ﬁgures 8 and 9, most transfers in rural Vietnam take place among
close-family members and few transfers occur among non-relatives. To avoid having too
much unbalance in our subsamples, we regroup both non-relatives and extended family
members in the category “non-family”.
10Initially, we included also lagged values of the other transfer types. Joint signiﬁcance
of the cross-transfer variables was however rejected at conventional signiﬁcance level, so
we excluded these cross-terms from our speciﬁcation.
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in section 1.2, in which the scope for risk sharing under limited commit-
ment is higher for high degrees of altruism between partners. Despite the
fact that risk sharing with non-kins could be potentially beneﬁcial because
income correlation among non-family members is likely to be lower than
among family members, these beneﬁts do not appear to be strong enough
compared to the costs imposed by commitment issues. Likewise, insurance
against life-cycle shocks at the household level also takes place only at the
family level. The coeﬃcient of the age dependency ratio in the non-family
transfer function is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Rural Vietnamese
families thus seem to use transfers to share risks of diﬀerent nature. While
the type of income shocks we are looking at is more transitory and unantic-
ipated, life-cycle shocks at the household level are certainly less transitory
and more predictable. Informal insurance in rural Vietnam seems to take
place primarily within the close-family network.
Current transfers, however, are still inﬂuenced negatively by past trans-
fers both for family-based transfers and for non-family transfers. Thus, even
when altruism is high, commitment issues are still limiting the scope for
risk sharing. This could reﬂect the fact that if on one hand altruism allows
more risk sharing to take place because partners care about each other, on
the other hand, altruism also introduces a deterrent eﬀect for risk shar-
ing by reducing the credibility of the punishment threat after one agent
deviates from the informal arrangement.
History dependence of informal transfers seems lower for family trans-
fers than for non-family transfers, suggesting that the eﬀects of limited
commitment are less binding among close family members. This could
be due to the fact that altruism is more important among close family
members, but it could also be resulting from the fact that information rel-
ative to past transfer history is better shared among close-family members.
One way to distinguish between these two possibilities is to look at fam-
ily transfers within and across localities. To the extent that information
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sharing concerning past violations of arrangements should also be higher
at the local level (even for non-family members), comparing the history de-
pendence eﬀects for family members and for non-family members located
in the same province should reﬂect the role of altruism only.
In colum (4) and (5) of table 13, the transfer function is estimated sep-
arately for ﬂows remaining within the provinces and for inter-provincial
ﬂows. The underlying assumption here is that transfer partners located
within the same province are likely to have higher income correlation com-
pared to transfer partners located in diﬀerent provinces. Transfers do re-
spond to shocks both within and between provinces. History dependence
is higher for transfers taking place at the local level, and the response of
transfers to income shocks seems also to be stronger at the provincial level.
This last result would seem to contradict prediction P3 outlined in section
1.3, but since we do not control here for the level of altruism between part-
ners, it is hard to distinguish the role of income correlation from that of
altruism. As suggested by the model presented above, when commitment
is limited, risk sharing is facilitated both by lower income correlation and
by higher degree of altruism between partners.
We now estimate the transfer function by splitting our sample according
to the relation and to the location of partners, but now we consider both
dimensions simultaneously. This allows us to look at the eﬀects of altruism
by controlling for income correlation and vice versa. Foster and Rosenzweig
(2001)’s model suggests that when the degree of altruism is suﬃciently high,
history dependence is positively associated with income correlation. More-
over, holding the degree of income correlation constant, transfers should be
more responsive to income shocks and less history dependent for a higher
degree of altruism. Both predictions seem to be supported by the data
when we look at table 14. Focusing on family transfers, the coeﬃcient on
past transfers is more negative for transfers taking place within the provin-
cial level (P4). Comparing family transfers (column (6)) to non-family
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transfers (column (8)) within provinces, we can see that higher degrees of
altruism are indeed associated with slightly lower history dependence and
with a stronger response of transfers to income shocks (P5). Given that we
are looking at transfers taking place at the local level, where information
regarding past transfer history is assumed to be better shared, we interpret
this last result as reﬂecting the fact that it is altruism per se, more than
improved information sharing within the family circle, that alleviates the
limited commitment constraints on risk sharing. The fact that the coef-
ﬁcient on income shocks is close to zero for non-family members suggests
that transfers are not driven by risk sharing motives outside the close family
circle.
1.7. Discussion
Even in the absence of well established markets or formal mechanisms
to properly insure against risks, households still have the possibility to
either manage their exposure to risks or cope with the consequences of
adverse shocks once they have occured. The current analysis focused on
one mechanism out of a broad portfolio of strategies available.
We compared the patterns of inter-household transfer ﬂows in rural
Vietnam to the predictions of a model of risk sharing with limited com-
mitment and altruistically related agents. Since two key parameters of the
model are not directly observable in the data (the degree of altruism and
the degree of income correlation between transfer partners) we had to dis-
tinguish between family-based transfers and non-family transfers, and also
between transfers taking place at the local province level and those ﬂowing
across provinces. Although this is certainly not the ideal way to control for
altruism and for income correlation, it gives a ﬁrst idea of how commitment
issues interact with altruism to shape insurance transfers in a country like
Vietnam.
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Inter-household transfers are important in Vietnam, both in frequency
and in magnitude, especially at the family level. These transfers did not
diminish between 1993 and 1998, which is a period where Vietnam experi-
enced high and sustained growth levels. Moreover, public transfers do not
seem to be crowding out informal insurance arrangements at the family
level.
One possible explanation behind these trends is the Confucian nature
of Vietnamese culture which places ﬁlial loyalty to parents at the center
stage of social relations. In that case, it would be diﬃcult to extend these
results to other environments where social institutions are built on diﬀerent
cultural background. The way altruism and commitment issues interact to
shape informal transfers should thus be empirically documented in diﬀerent
contexts to see whether these transfers are an eﬀective vehicle for insurance
and whether informal transfers are complements or substitutes to formal
insurance. Albarran and Attanasio (2003) for example found evidence that
public transfers are substitutes to private transfers in Mexico. This crowd-
ing out eﬀect is shown however to be larger in communities where the
variance of income is smaller.
1.8. Conclusion
We have looked at household data collected in rural Vietnam in the
1990’s to ask whether informal transfers serve as a vehicle for insurance in
an environment where insurance markets are absent and where contracts are
not enforceable ex-post. In this kind of environment, Foster and Rosenzweig
(2001) have shown that altruism helps alleviating commitment problems
and could thus enlarge the scope for potential risk sharing between agents.
By distinguishing transfers along two observable dimensions, the location
and the relation between transfer partners, we were able to conﬁrm the
ﬁndings of Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) using a diﬀerent dataset.
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Transfers in rural Vietnam provide some insurance by responding to
income shocks and to life-cycle shocks within close-family networks only.
For non-family members, altruism is too low and commitment issues too
high for risk sharing to take place. A higher degree of altruism at the
family level, together perhaps with better information sharing, allow for
higher risk sharing through informal transfers. Nevertheless, even if partial
insurance is provided, lack of commitment constraints are still binding and
prevent full risk sharing to take place.
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Appendix: Income calculation details.
(1) Land payments:
(a) payments received from rent (+)
(b) payments made to use owned land (-)







(f) Lease of farming equipment











(i) Lease of building
(j) Lease of machines
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Table 1: Summary Characteristics of Households in Sample.
N = 3465 1993 1998
Mean (sd) Median Mean (sd) Median
Household size 5.08 (2.1) 5 4.84 (1.95) 5
Age of head 45.2 (14.7) 42 47.86 (13.9) 45
Age dependency ratio .422 (.23) .5 .398 (.25) 0.43
Consumption per capita 1614.6 (943.7) 1294.3 2218.5 (1361.1) 1897.8
Total income per capita 1725.3 (2398.5) 1409.5 2753.2 (2743.5) 2081.5
Pre-transfer income 1695.7 (2420.1) 1383.4 2716.9 (2889.4) 2047.3
Total land surface+a 3804.1 (5044.9) 2628 3670.8 (5692.0) 2379
Irrigated land surface+a 1947.5 (3549.3) 1099 2629.7 (4602.8) 1620
# disasters in past 5 years 3.96 (3.17) 3 6.19 (6.44) 5
Value of livestocka 1917.1 (3921.9) 1024.8 1856.6 (2602.5) 915.6
Value of equipmenta 751.3 (3321.7) 62.9 1226.6 (4659.8) 152.2
% participating in transfers 24.1 (42.8) . 33.4 (47.2) .
% sending transfers 11.9 (32.4) . 16.9 (37.5) .
% receiving transfers 14.1 (34.8) . 20.6 (40.4) .
Amount sent ( senders)b 552.4 (1381.8) 236.6 1449.0 (3675.9) 448.4
Amount received ( receivers)b 892.5 (1612.3) 460.1 1566.9 (3198.8) 646.7
% Receiving public transfers 19.6 (39.7) . 21.2 (40.9) .





The average ages reported in table 1 for 1993 and 1998 do not account for (a) heads who moved,
(b) heads who died and (c) heads who changed. The reported average age diﬀerence is less than 5 because
the new heads in 1998 were usually younger than previous heads in 1993.
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Table 3: Transfer frequencies.
Percentage of households involved in transfers
N = 3465 1993 1998 93/98
Transfers in Country 24.1 33.4 44.0
Transfers in Province 7.3 23.4 27.1
Transfers in Family 25.8 31.2 42.6
Percentage of households involved in transfers
N = 3465 Transfers to Family Transfers to Non-Fam.
Transfers in Province 25.7 2.8
Transfers out of Province 19.1 3.1
Table 4: Magnitude of Transfers in % of Pre-Transfer Income
(conditional on participation).
1993 1998
Average Amount Received 10.6 11.9
Average Amount Sent 6.5 11.1
In % of Receivers/Senders Income
1993 1998
Average Amount Received 16.3 19.7
Average Amount Sent 4.9 7.8
Table 5: Net Senders and Net Receivers Pre-Transfer Income
(conditional means).
Pre-Transfer Income in Thousand VND 1993 1998
Net Receivers 1192.8 1796.4
Net Senders 2383.9 4154.7
|t-statistic| (H0 :equality) 9.1 10.5
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Table 6: Origin and Destination of transfers.
(in % of total transfers received/sent in the country) 1993 1998
Received Transfers From Same Province 25.3 65.1
From Same Region 55.9 75.3
Sent Transfers From Same Province 27.4 63.4
From Same Region 58.2 72.9
Table 7: Asset Value (conditional means and medians, in thou-
sand 1998 VND).
1993 1998
mean median mean median
Livestock 2201.1 1330.2 2298.4 1442.9
Savings 2906.9 855.4 3118.8 722.9
Equipment 1329.5 328.3 1776.2 447.5
Table 8: Land Holdings (conditional means and percentiles, in
m2).
1993
Mean 25%tile Median 75%tile
Total Land 4306.2 1874 3000 4920
Irrigated Land 3252.2 1500 2381 3533
1998
Mean 25%tile Median 75%tile
Total Land 4469.3 1850 2875 4680
Irrigated Land 3742.1 1500 2342 3693
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Table 9: First Stage IV Regressions.
Summary Results (Heteroskedasticity-robust F-Statistics)
F (13;3449) p   value Shea Partial R2
Net transfers out in 1993 [(1) to (9)]:
(1) Overall 12.7 0.00 0.136
(2) Family 15.6 0.00 0.163
(3) Non Family 11.3 0.00 0.117
(4) In Province 13.8 0.00 0.124
(5) Out of Province 9.8 0.00 0.101
(6) Family In Province 14.2 0.00 0.151
(7) Family Out of Province 13.0 0.00 0.143
(8) Non-Family In Province 11.5 0.00 0.135
(9) Non-Family Out of Province 9.6 0.00 0.098
Income Shock 12.1 0.00 0.125
Value of Livestock 414.3 0.00 0.448
Savings 340.4 0.00 0.353
Equipment Value 37.7 0.00 0.255
Public Assistance 15.6 0.00 0.192
The instrument set includes: Initial values of asset variables (livestock, savings, equipment),
irrigated and non-irrigated (inherited) land holdings in 1993, together with their interaction
with natural disaster shocks (1988-1998).
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Income Structure in 1998
Figure 3: Income Structure by Regions.
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At disaggregated transfer level, 1993 and 1998











































































At disaggregated transfer level, 1993 and 1998
Average Amount of Transfers Sent, By Region of Destination
1993 1998
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Figure 6: Gross Received Transfers Composition
(Location of Origin).
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At transfer level, by location of origin
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At transfer level, by location of origin
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Figure 7: Gross Sent Transfers Composition
(Location of Destination).
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At transfer level, by location of destination
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At transfer level, by location of destination
Regional Composition of Gross Sent Transfers, 1998
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Optimal Risk Sharing Under Limited Commitment:
Evidence From Rural Vietnam
2.1. Introduction
Risk in rural developing economies is pervasive and has major inﬂuence
on welfare. In these economies, agriculture is often the main source of
income and it is very sensitive to the realization of natural shocks. Besides,
formal institutions and insurance mechanisms designed to cope with risks
are often weak or nonexistent. Absent formal insurance markets, informal
insurance mechanisms allow households to mitigate the inﬂuence of risks on
welfare. In this paper we study the eﬀectiveness of informal arrangements in
protecting farmers’ consumption from income shocks in a village economy.
Alderman and Paxson (1992) and Fafchamps (2003) provide a compre-
hensive review of the various risk coping mechanisms in which households
can engage. A large literature have followed the work initiated by Cochrane
(1991) and Mace (1991) for the US and by Townsend (1994) in rural India
to test a central implication of the full insurance model: if markets are
complete, idiosyncratic shocks to income should leave consumption unaf-
fected. Most of these studies were based on testing the null hypothesis
of full insurance against an unspeciﬁed alternative model. The consensus
that emerged from these studies is that even though in some cases observed
consumption comes close to the full insurance allocation, perfect risk shar-
ing is always rejected by the data. This has led researchers to work on
models that provide a better account of the data. Two main hypotheses
were advanced to help reconciling the theory and the data: information
asymmetries and incentive problems.
50
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Examples of theoretical work on the role of asymmetric information in
shaping the optimal allocation can be found in Thomas and Worrall (1990),
Wang (1994), Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) and Doepke and Townsend
(2006). We assume here instead complete information and we focus on
contract enforcement constraints. Some important theoretical and empir-
ical contributions in this literature include Thomas and Worrall (1988),
Kocherlakota (1996), Ligon et al. (2002), and Dubois et al. (2008).
Thomas and Worrall (1988) characterize the eﬃcient allocation in a set-
ting where a risk neutral ﬁrm and a risk averse worker trade labour without
being able to commit to their contract. They show that limited commit-
ment introduces some persistence into the eﬃcient allocation. Intuitively, if
some shocks can only be partially smoothed across states because of bind-
ing commitment contraints, it is then optimal to also smooth part of these
shocks across time.
Kocherlakota (1996) argues that a positive correlation between indi-
vidual consumption and both current and past realizations of income can
emerge in models with complete information and limited commitment.
However, this property is also a feature of models with asymmetric informa-
tion and without contract enforcement problems. His work shows that the
way history matters in eﬃcient allocations is diﬀerent between these two
environments. In the limited commitment case, the ratio of marginal util-
ities between agents is a suﬃcient statistic to predict future consumption
while it is not so in models of asymmetric information.
Ligon et al. (2002) and Dubois et al. (2008) build on the theoretical
insight provided by Thomas and Worrall (1988) and Kocherlakota (1996),
and they oﬀer interesting empirical applications1.
1Foster and Rosenzweig (2001), which provides the analytical framework for our previous
chapter on transfers, also builds on Thomas and Worrall (1988) and on Ligon et al. (2002)
to derive empirically testable predictions for informal transfer ﬂows in environments
where commitment is limited.
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Ligon et al. (2002) study eﬃcient insurance when information is com-
plete but commitment is limited. Their constrained eﬃcient contract can
be characterized by a simple updating rule based on a ratio of marginal util-
ities, and which is similar to a debt contract with occasional forgiveness.
They compare the full risk-pooling model with the limited commitment
model by focusing on the dynamic behavior of consumption and income.
Using ICRISAT data collected in three Indian villages between 1975 and
1984, they conclude that the limited commitment hypothesis is better able
to ﬁt observed consumption dynamics and their correlation with income
changes.
Dubois et al. (2008), derived implications from a model with no en-
forcement and where formal contracts coexist with voluntary transfers to
spread income risk across states. Their analysis focus on the interaction
between contracts and informal arrangements. In this environment, they
show that formal contracts act as a form of collateral by relaxing commit-
ment constraints, and thus by increasing the set of incentive compatible
allocations.
A common feature in the work of Ligon et al. (2002) and Dubois et al.
(2008) is that they rely on the dynamic aspect of the model’s predictions
to derive testable implications. This strategy is particularly well suited to
bring the limited commitment model to panel data with a suﬃciently large
time dimension. Our work is complementary to theirs in the sense that we
use instead a cross-sectional implication of a limited commitment model to
propose a simple test of informal insurance when contracts are not perfectly
enforceable. This allows us to confront the model to a diﬀerent dataset
which is shorter in its time dimension, but larger in the cross section.
In this paper, we use household survey data from Vietnam to study the
eﬀectiveness of risk sharing arrangements in insuring consumption among
farmers. We focus on idiosyncratic shocks to agricultural revenues. Our
main ﬁnding is that, although the full insurance model is rejected by the
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data, the relation between idiosyncratic shocks and consumption is consis-
tent with a simple model of risk sharing with lack of commitment. Under
limited commitment, villagers can choose to renege on previous arrange-
ments if the cost of honoring their contract is higher than the cost of default.
In this environment, second-best risk sharing contracts can still be passed
such that consumption is stabilized in case of unfavorable shocks. At the
same time, villagers can enjoy higher consumption in proportion to realized
shocks in case of more favorable events.
2.2. Analytical Framework
We consider a model of risk sharing in a village economy where one
agent only (the moneylender) can commit to honor a contract whilst the
others (the villagers) can’t . This way of modelling originates from Green
(1987) and it is the approach adopted by Thomas and Worrall (1988), and
Dubois et al. (2008). We follow the model exposition given in Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2004).
2.2.1. Basic Setup.
2.2.1.1. The Villagers. Villagers are ex-ante identical and have stan-







0(:) > 0, u
00 (:) < 0 and  2 (0;1). At every period t, agents re-
ceive a stochastic endowment f"tg
1
t=0 which is identically and independently
distributed across time and across agents with probability Prob("t = "s)=s,
where states of nature are drawn from a ﬁnite set s 2 f1;2;:::;Sg and can
be ordered as "s > "s+1. There is no storage possibility and no ﬁnancial
market, and at every period t  1, the villager has a history of endowments
ht = ("t;"t 1;:::;"0).
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Since the villagers are risk averse, if markets were complete, they would
trade date and history-contingent claims ex-ante in order to fully insure
themselves against idiosyncratic variations in income. Because all agents
share the same preferences, they would then all consume the average per





















2.2.1.2. The Moneylender. There is a moneylender (or a planner) in this
economy who can trade with the rest of the world and with the villagers,
while the villagers cannot trade among themselves. The moneylender is as-
sumed to be committed to his promises. Villagers on the other hand cannot
commit and are free to deviate from any previously made arrangement at
any time. The consequence of such deviation is to remain in autarchy
forever. Kocherlakota (1996) shows that in these settings, autarchy is the
worst possible punishment for an agent who deviates. Knowing this, the ob-
jective of the moneylender is thus to design a contract which is self-enforcing
in the sense that villagers choose not to renege on the arrangement.
The contract is such that at every period the villagers give away their
period-t endowment "t to the moneylender who then redistributes ct back
to the villagers, as was promised during the preceding period. The con-
tract speciﬁes history-dependent streams of consumption ct = ft (ht). The
moneylender expects to earn




t ("t   ct):
If a villager reneges on the contract he remains in autarchy forever,
consuming his endowment only. In this case, the ex-ante expected utility
of the villager in present terms is given by
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In period t, after the realization of the state of nature s, the present
value of the villager’s utility is simply
u("t) + vaut:
The moneylender must therefore design a contract that oﬀers at least
the ex-post present value of autarchy to the villagers:




j 1u[ft+j (ht+j)]  u("t) + vaut:
Such a contract is said to be sustainable as it will induce the expected
utility maximizing villager to participate in the arrangement.
An eﬃcient contract is a sustainable contract which maximizes (2.13).
Any such contract must, after any history ht, include an eﬃcient continua-
tion contract which also satisﬁes the participation constraints (2.15). This
promised expected discounted future value of utility is forward looking in






It is possible to reformulate this kind of problem in a recursive way,
having in each period the moneylender delivering ct after observing "t (in
accordance with the promise made in the preceding period vt), and promis-
ing a continuation value for the future vt+1.
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The constrained-eﬃcient contract oﬀered by the moneylender must there-
fore solve the following problem:




s [ "s   cs] + P (ws) (2.16)
s:t:
PS
s=1 s [u(cs) + ws]  v (2.17)
u(cs) + ws  u("s) + vaut, 8s (2.18)
cs 2 [cmin;cmax] (2.19)
ws 2 [vaut;  v]; (2.20)
where (2.16) is a functional Bellman equation and ws is the continu-
ation value promised to the villager for the next period. Equation (2.17)
states that the moneylender must deliver a value at least equal to what was
promised to honor the contract, and (2.18) is the participation constraint
for the villagers.
2.2.2. Constrained-Eﬃcient Contract. We can form a Lagrangian














s fu(cs) + ws   u("s) + vautg;
This yields the following ﬁrst order conditions
(s + s)u
0
(cs) = s (2.22)
s + s =  sP
0
(ws) (2.23)
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The way the current promised value ws depends on the promised value
from the preceding period v is a function of the realized state of nature.
More speciﬁcally, it depends on whether the participation constraint (2.18)
binds (s > 0) or not (s = 0).
For realized states of nature yielding low endowment values "s (unfavor-
able shocks), the participation constraint (2.18) holds as a strict inequality
u(cs) + ws > u("s) + vaut so that s = 0. Condition (2.25) implies
that the promised continuation value for the next period remains the same,
ws = v, and thus u
0 (cs) =  P
0 (v). Consumption depends on the contin-
uation value v, but not on the realized state of nature "s. Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2004) show that the solution can be writen as
cs = g (v) (2.26)
ws = v: (2.27)
As realized states of nature become more favorable to the villager,
there exists a threshold level of endowment, say , for which the house-
hold is indiﬀerent between participating in the arrangement and remaining
in autarchy forever after. When the participation constraint binds, then
s > 0 ) P
0 (ws) < P
0 (v) ) ws > v because P
00(:) < 0 by concavity. This
means that the moneylender must oﬀer the villager a higher continuation
value ws compared to the promise made in the previous period v. Moreover,
if ws > v, the binding participation constraint u(cs)+ws = u("s)+vaut,
together with condition (2.20), implies that cs < "s. So in exchange for an
increased continuation value, the villager must accept to give away part of
his received endowment to the moneylender. Current consumption cs and
Hoang-Vu Eozenou, Patrick (2010), Essays on Risk-Sharing and Development 
European University Institute 
 
DOI: 10.2870/182152.2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 58
promised continuation value ws are determined by solving






where (2.29) is obtained by combining (2.22) and (2.23). These two
equations depend only on the realized income state "s and not on the past
promise v. The solution in that case can be writen as
cs = g ("s) (2.30)
ws = l("s); (2.31)
where g(:) is increasing in its argument.
The threshold level  at which the participation constraint binds, and
for which the regime for the constrained-eﬃcient contract changes, can be









and then substituting this value into (2.18) at equality
u[(v)] + v = u[g(v)] + vaut:
Combining these two exclusive regimes where s > 0 and s = 0 , we











This contract is represented graphically in ﬁgure 1. For values of "s <
(v), the moneylender guarantees a consumption level of g(v) to the house-
hold, independently of the realized endowment ", and the continuation
value is kept unchanged. When the endowment shocks become more fa-
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vorable, though, ("s > (v)), the moneylender must allow the household
to consume part of his endowment (cs = g1 ("s) < "s), and the remaining
part "s   cs is taken by the moneylender in exchange for an increase in
the promised future utility ws. In this case, consumption should depend
positively on the realized endowment.
We use this feature of the constrained-eﬃcient contract to test the lim-
ited commitment model against the complete market model. If contract
enforcement and limited commitment constraints were not relevant, then
observed consumption should not depend on realized income shocks what-
ever their level. If these constraints matter, however, an implication of the
limited commitment model described above is that consumption should re-
main independent of realized income shocks only for unfavorable shocks.
For more favorable realizations, consumption should depend positively on
income shocks.
2.3. Empirical model
Much of the previous applied work related to risk sharing tests in village
economies is based on testing the null hypothesis of full insurance against
an unspeciﬁed alternative hypothesis. Based on the same benchmark test
equation, we use the model outlined in the previous section to specify an
alternative hypothesis test of risk sharing under limited commitment.
2.3.1. Reduced Form Equation. If risk is perfectly insured at the
village level, all idiosyncratic income shocks should be irrelevant for individ-
ual consumption. This result is the basis of the following benchmark risk
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where c
j
t is a measure of household j’s consumption and CA
t is average
consumption at the commune level, which captures the inﬂuence of aggre-
gate shocks on individual consumption. X
j
t is a vector of household char-
acteristics which is meant to capture observed heterogeneity in taste due to
diﬀerences in household demographic composition, for example, and j is
a household ﬁxed eﬀects introduced to capture unobserved time-invariant
heterogeneity in household consumption. Finaly, "
j
t is our measure of id-
iosyncratic shock to income and v
j
t is a random disturbance term which is
assumed to have mean zero and to be identically distributed across house-
holds. We further assume that these errors are independently distributed
across communes but not necessarily across households within the same
commune.
Equation (2.34) can be derived from the ﬁrst order conditions of a
social planner’s problem where the planner seeks to maximize a sum of
weighted CARA utilities under a commune level aggregate resource con-
straint2. Based on this speciﬁcation and under the null hypothesis of full
insurance, we should observe 1 = 1 and 3 = 0. Since the household ﬁxed
eﬀects j are not observable, and if at least two periods are available, then
applying a ﬁrst diﬀerence operator on equation (2.34) removes the ﬁxed
eﬀects and the parameters  can be consistently estimated by OLS.
As pointed out in Morduch (2002), while the inability to reject the null
hypothesis of full insurance is informative, rejecting the benchmark model
when several alternatives are possible is less so. In this paper we will work
with shock variables that are continuously distributed and can take positive
and negative values. This allows us to distinguish the eﬀects of favorable
shocks from unfavorable ones, and by doing so we can compare the complete
market case to an alternative scenario derived from the limited commitment
model examined in the previous section.
2Assuming CRRA utility functions instead yields a similar speciﬁcation with variables
expressed in logs rather than in level: logc
j





t + j + v
j
t.
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If commitment constraints are binding, we should observe that




t  ; and (2.35)




t  ; (2.36)
where  is the threshold level of income shock below which consumption
is partially insured, and above which households must be partially compen-
sated to remain in the informal insurance agreement. Before turning to the
empirical tests, we now give a description of the Vietnamese household
data.
2.4. The Vietnam Living Standard Survey
2.4.1. Survey Design. The Vietnam Living Standard Surveys (VLSS)
are two household surveys conducted in 1992/93 and 1997/98 by the Gen-
eral Statistical Oﬃce (GSO) of Vietnam3. The questionnaires were designed
to cover a wide range of areas related to living standards and economic
activity, with a particular emphasis on consumption and agricultural pro-
duction. Both surveys provide comparable and representative data at the
national level. In both years, the survey is a stratiﬁed random sampling
conducted in three stages. The sample size is 4800 households in 1992/93
and 5999 households in 1997/98. In total, 4305 households were interviewed
in both rounds. The overall sample was stratiﬁed into two groups, urban
(20% of the population) and rural, and sampling was carried out separately
in each strata. In these two groups, 150 communes were randomly selected
in order to represent all provinces of Vietnam (ﬁrst stage). Out of these
150 communes, 120 were from rural areas. Finaly, in each commune, 2
villages were randomly chosen (second stage), and in each village about 20
households were randomly chosen for interviews (third stage).
3These surveys were part of the Living Standard Measurement Study (LSMS) surveys
taking place in many developing countries with technical assistance from the World
Bank.
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In this paper, we focus on rural households for which agriculture is the
main activity and who were interviewed in both waves. This constitutes a
panel of 2863 observations over 2 time periods4.
2.4.2. Consumption Data. Information on consumption expendi-
tures is available at a fair level of disaggregation. Consumption data include
food expenditures and non food expenditures. Food expenditures are col-
lected over 45 food items by a variable-recall procedure: for each item,
household members are asked about quantity and value of purchases, the
number of months during the year in which items were bought, and the
frequency of purchases during these months. In addition to annual mar-
ket purchases, the value of home production consumed during the year is
also computed. Non-food expenditures include daily expenses, annual ex-
penditures, expenditures on consumer durables, expenditures from utilities
(water, electricity, etc.) and housing expenses.
For the purpose of this paper we focus on two consumption aggregates to
study consumption risk sharing: total consumption expenditures and food
expenditures. Variables are all expressed in 1998 prices with adjustments
for monthly and regional price variations.
2.4.3. Shocks to Farm Revenues. We construct a measures of id-
iosyncratic shocks to income based on the residual from an estimated agri-
cultural production function. Farmers in our sample engage in perennial
cropping, livestock raising and water-culture activities. The dataset con-
tains detailed information on cultivated surfaces, hours worked on farm
and various inputs used for production in the two survey rounds, so we can
estimate (2.34) using panel ﬁxed eﬀects regression.
Since we want to use the residuals of an estimated production function
as a measure of exogenous random shocks to agricultural revenues, we want
to control for as many factors as we can which are not purely random or
4We narrow our focus on rural households for which agriculture is the main activity
because we rely on estimated shocks to farm revenues as a measure of income shocks.
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exogenous to the farmers. These include, observed inputs and production
factors, but they also include any form of observed or unobserved farm level
heterogeneity. Unobservable farm speciﬁc factors could well result in diﬀer-
ences in total factor productivity and in factor speciﬁc eﬃciency. In order
to control for variations across households in total factor productivity, we
choose to estimate a stochastic production frontier model. The production
frontier approach deﬁnes global technical ineﬃciency as a distance between
observed production levels and a common potential maximal level of pro-
duction. Since the deviations from the production frontier might not be
entirely under the control of the farmers, because of some exogenous ran-
dom shocks for example, Aigner et al. (1977) propose a stochastic frontier
formulation in which the reference level of potential production is allowed
to vary across farms for reasons exogenous to the production model. In
addition to heterogeneity in total factor productivity, we allow for factor
speciﬁc variations in technology useage across households. In order to do
this, we estimate the stochastic frontier model under a random parameter
speciﬁcation. The production model we consider can be writen as:
yit = T
i Xit + T
ctct + it   uit (2.37)
it  N (0;2
), uit  jN (0;2
u)jand it ? uit (2.38)
i =  +  vi (2.39)
E [i] =  and V ar[i] = ; (2.40)
where yit is the (log of) real value of total revenues from agriculture ac-
tivities. Xit contains observable factors of production such as total owned
land surface, hired labor expenditures, hours worked on farm, capital value
and total input expenditures (all in logs) and observable farm speciﬁc char-
acteristics (household size, number of crops grown, primary and secondary
education indicators for household heads). ct is a set of commune-year
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dummy variables which is introduced to capture commune speciﬁc charac-
teristics such as aggregate shocks or soil conditions. The technical ineﬃ-
ciency parameter uit is random, follows a truncated normal distribution,
and is assumed to be orthogonal to the error term it. The coeﬃcients i
are also varying randomly around a mean , with variance . The pa-
rameters of the model are estimated using Maximum Simulated Likelihood
(see Train (2002), Econometric Software (2007) and Greene (2001, 2005)
for details).
The results of the stochastic frontier production model estimation are
reported in table 1a and 1b. We ﬁrst pool the data and estimate the model
by OLS (columns (1) and (2)). We then estimate the random parameter
speciﬁcation. Based on a likelihood ratio test (columns (3) and (4)), we
reject the hypothesis of coeﬃcient homogeneity in favor of the random
parameter speciﬁcation5. The average production eﬃciency is estimated
to be at 70% of the frontier level in our sample, with farm level eﬃciency
varying between 3% and 94%. The estimated production function exhibits
decreasing returns to scale, with land and input expenditures (in seeds,
fertilizers, insecticides and services) contributing the most to agricultural
revenues.
Figure 3 and 4, together with table 2 present the distribution of these
estimated shocks to agricultural revenues. This distribution is relatively
stable between 1993 and 1998 and the estimated shocks are about -2% on
average in our sample.
2.5. Results
2.5.1. Threshold Estimation. Expressions (2.35) and (2.36) deﬁne a
threshold for the response of consumption to income shocks. We estimate
this parameter using threshold regression methods developed by Hansen
(1999, 2000).
5The test statistics is 2
(2) = 2(4099:3   3979:4) = 239:8
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By splitting the support of "
j
t in two, we can rewrite equation (2.34) as
(2.41) c
j
















where I(:) is the indicator function. Consumption per capita is mea-
sured at the household level with c
j
t, and an aggregate consumption variable
is formed at the commune level to capture common movements in consump-
tion6. Hansen (2000, 1999) shows how to estimate this type of nonlinear
models by OLS. The presence of a threshold eﬀect can be assessed by testing
the linear constraint
H0 : 4 = 5:
If b  exists, it can be consistently estimated and Hansen (1996) shows
how to derive asymptotically valid standard errors using bootstrap meth-
ods. Conﬁdence intervals can then be constructed around b  to conduct
inference7.
The results for the threshold model estimation are reported in tables
3 and 4. We ﬁrst test the existence of a threshold eﬀect for total con-
sumption and for food consumption. Both tests reject the null hypothesis
of homogenous coeﬃcients at the 99% conﬁdence level. We then estimate
the threshold point above and below which the impact of income shocks
on consumption diﬀers. For total consumption, this threshold is estimated
at 7.3%, and this value lies within the interval [-3.5%; 18.2%] with a 95%
conﬁdence level. The results for food consumption are similar, with a point
estimate at 5.8% and a 95% conﬁdence interval of [-3.4%; 14.9%]. These in-
tervals can be represented by a plot of the concentrated likelihood function
against the 95% critical value above which no threshold eﬀect is detected
(see ﬁgure 1).
6We compute the village level mean for every individual j by leaving out the own con-
sumption of j.
7The estimation procedure consists in sorting the "
j
t, and for every value taken by the
threshold variable, estimate (2.41) by OLS with variables expressed in deviation from
their mean. The estimated threshold is then chosen to be the value that minimises the
concentrated sum of square errors from these within regressions.
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If we look at the parameter estimates of table 4 we notice ﬁrst that the
idiosyncratic component of shocks to farmers revenues matter for consump-
tion. Full insurance is clearly rejected by the data, and this is true both for
total consumption (1a) and for food consumption (2a). Now if we distin-
guish the shocks to revenues above and below the estimated thresholds, we
see that the coeﬃcient on the shock variable is positive and signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero for favourable shocks and not diﬀerent from zero for
unfavourable shocks. This is again true for both total consumption and for
food consumption
8.
These results indicate that consumption is insured only for unfavourable
shocks. Even if the observed consumption allocations suggest that full
insurance is not achieved, we can see that shocks to revenues are partially
insured. This pattern is consistent with a model of risk sharing with limited
commitment as outlined in section 2.2.
Since shocks to farmers revenues are constructed as a residual of a
production function, it is possible that the shock variable contains some
measurement error. In order to assess whether our results are robust to
endogeneity bias due to some measurement error on the estimated shock
variable, we use instruments for our measure of shocks to revenues. We
take advangtage of the information collected at the commune level on the
occurence of natural disasters
9 to construct our instruments. More specif-
ically, we use inherited land surface owned at the begining of the survey
period, together with their interaction with natural disasters as instruments
for shocks to agricultural revenues. We assume here that natural disasters
interacted with initial land holdings are correlated with income shocks be-
tween 1993 and 1998, but are exogenous to consumption. Figure 5 displays
some characteristics of land use in 1993 and of natural disasters between
8
9Natural disasters were deﬁned during the survey as any unfavourable event causing a
crop loss of 10% or more at the commune level.
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1993 and 1998. The northern regions have a relatively higher share of irri-
gated land in 1993 compared to the South, but inherited land surfaces are
higher in the South. The average share of rural communes experiencing 1
disaster or more in the year is relatively stable, between 20%-30%, over the
survey period.
2.5.2. Panel Results. Since the estimation method proposed by Hansen
(1999) does not accomodate instrumental variables in a panel context we
use the estimated threshold ^  to split the support of "
j
t and we test (2.35)
and (2.36) using standard instrumental variable ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions.
For comparison we report ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimates with and without in-
struments for shocks to revenues.
The results from the ﬁxed eﬀect panel tests10 are given in table 5. We
ﬁnd again that both total and food consumption are aﬀected by shocks
to agricultural revenues (3a and 4a). This result also holds when we use
inherited land surfaces together with their interactions with natural disas-
ters as instruments for the estimated shocks to revenues (3c and 4c). The
null hypothesis of full insurance is again rejected for the two consumption
aggregates11.
Looking now at the results from the alternative speciﬁcation (2.41), we
conﬁrm that while favorable shocks still have a positive impact on both
total consumption and on food consumption, unfavorable shocks seem to
be insured for the two consumption aggregates (3b and 4b). Again, using
instruments for the estimated shocks do not alter our results, although
food consumption seems to increase with favorable shocks only at the 90%
conﬁdence level (3d and 4d).
Considering the impact of shocks to agricultural revenues on consump-
tion in rural Vietnam, our tests reject the hypothesis of full insurance at
10Haussman tests reject the random eﬀect speciﬁcation in favor of the ﬁxed eﬀects.
11We ran the same regressions with commune-year dummy variables instead of average
consumption at the commune level to capture all aggregate variation at the commune-
level, and we obtained very similar results.
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the commune level in favor of an alternative hypothesis of partial risk shar-
ing under binding commitment constraints. This result holds for total
consumption and for food consumption, and it is robust to potential mea-
surement error on the shock variable.
2.6. Discussion
In an environment with complete information, no storage possibility
and where agents cannot commit to honor their contracts, partial risk shar-
ing still Pareto dominates the autarkic allocation but full insurance is not
feasible. The planner needs to design a self-enforcing contract which inter-
nalizes the participation constraints of the villagers. A noticeable feature
of this constrained-eﬃcient contract is that at any point in time, consump-
tion does not depend on realized income for households hit by unfavorable
shocks. Households who experience more favorable realizations, however,
see their current consumption level increase with income. This nonlinearity
in the response of consumption to income shocks provides the basis of a
simple test to assess the plausibility of limited commitment in explaining
the documented absence of full insurance in village economies.
Our ﬁndings are similar to those of Ligon et al. (2002) and Foster and
Rosenzweig (2001) in the sense that they tend to support the limited com-
mitment hypothesis against the extreme alternatives of autarchy or full risk
pooling. The work of Dubois et al. (2008) brings nuances to these conslu-
sions however. Their results from an application with Pakistanese data
suggest that both formal and informal arrangements coexist at the village
level and interact to provide eﬃcient insurance to rural households.
An important question posed by limited commitment models for policy
design is the net welfare eﬀect of public insurance schemes. Addressing this
issue, Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000) show that the net welfare eﬀect of
introducing compulsory mutual insurance programs is ambiguous a priori.
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The reason being that when informal arrangements already exist, intro-
ducing formal public insurance augments the scope for risk sharing, but it
also reduces the punishment value of deviating from the informal contract,
which in turn limits risk sharing possibilities further. Therefore, the poten-
tial for crowding out eﬀects needs to be carefully assessed when evaluating
the social impact of conditional cash transfers (or of larger public insurance
schemes) in rural environment.
2.7. Conclusion
Looking at panel data from rural Vietnam collected during the 1990’s,
we have tested whether estimated shock to agricultural revenues had some
relevance in explaining the cross sectional distribution of consumption. Our
results reject the full insurance hypothesis, except for food consumption
with respect to harvest shocks. In general, the observed consumption al-
locations seem more consistent with a model of risk sharing where agents
cannot commit to honor their contract. In such a setting, the planner needs
to design a self-enforcing contract which rewards households for whom the
participation constraint is binding. The reward consists in increasing both
the level of current consumption and the promised value of future utility
just enough as to keep the household indiﬀerent between reneging and re-
maining in the arrangement. In exchange for an increase in promised future
utility, the household has to abandon part of his endowment to the planner.
As a result, consumption should not depend on income when households
are hit by unfavorable shocks, but there should be a positive correlation be-
tween consumption and income for households experiencing more favorable
shocks.
We estimated the threshold level of income shock above which the par-
ticipation contraints bind at about 5%-7%. Consistently with the model’s
predictions, we found that consumption is unrelated to income shocks below
this threshold and that a positive association exists above this threshold.
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Table 1b: Stochastic Frontier Production Function (Continued)
N = 2863 Pooled SFM Random Parameter Model




 1.18 1.15 1.49 1.54
 .65 .63 .59 .57
u .49 .47 .49 .48
 .42 .41 .33 .31
Estimated Eﬃciency, exp( ^ u)
Mean .69 .70 .69 .70
SD .11 .10 .11 .11
Min .15 .16 .03 .03
Max .93 .93 .94 .94
Estimated Shocks in % [(  100)logy]
Mean -0.04 -0.04 -1.65 -1.9
SD 34.8 34.6 34.7 35.0
Min -98.6 -93.9 -78.0 -76.8
Max 108.8 105.7 100.9 100.2
Information Criteria
Log Likelihood -4228.7 -4099.3 -4128.5 -3979.4
Akaike IC 1.50 1.46 1.46 1.45
Finite Sample AIC 1.50 1.46 1.46 1.45
Bayesian IC 1.53 1.49 1.50 1.48
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Table 2: Estimated Shocks to Revenues
(in %) Ag. Rev. Shocks 1993 Ag. Rev. Shocks 1998
N 2863 2863
[Min; Max] [-77; +99.7] [-76.8; +100.2]
Mean -2.0 -1.9
Median -3.5 -4.1
St. Dev 29.4 32.5
Percentile Intervals
[1%; 99%] [-67.6; +75.0] [-68.8; +81.2]
[5%; 95%] [-47.4; +50.9] [-53.2; +57.0]
[10%; 90%] [-37.9; +36.0] [-43.8; +41.3]
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Table 3: Test For Single Threshold Eﬀect
H0 : No threshold eﬀect Total Consumption Food Consumption
LR statistic 68.7 57.3
P-value 0.00 0.00
(10%, 5%, 1% crtitical values) 9.10, 11.8, 14.2 9.10, 10.0, 15.3
Statistics and critical values are calculated using bootstrap methods with 300 replications.
Table 4: Threshold Regression Estimates
 Estimates 95% CI
Total Consumption 7.35 [-3.47; 18.2]
Food Consumption 5.77 [-3.36; 14.9]
Statistics and critical values are calculated using bootstrap methods with 300 replications.
Total Consumption (^  = 7:35) Food Consumption (^  = 5:77)
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Shocks to Revenues 3(^ ) 1.58 (0.30)
 1.36 (0.29)

Favorable Shocks 4(^ ) 2.07 (0.46)
 1.77 (0.45)

Unfavorable Shocks 5(^ ) 0.90 (0.57) 0.79 (0.56)






2 0.34 0.34 0.28 0.28
H0 : 1 = 1 (p-value) 19.57 (0.00) 20.03 (0.00) 26.94 (0.00) 27.46 (0.00)
H0 : 1 = 1 and 3 = 0 20.64 (0.00) 28.87 (0.00)
Age dependency ratio is included but not reported.
Standard errors are calculated using bootstrap methods with 300 replications.
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Figure 1: Optimal Contract Under Limited Commitment.
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Figure 2: Threshold Estimation, Likelihoo Ratios Plots.
Total Consumption
Food Consumption
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Financial Integration and Macroeconomic Volatility:
Does Financial Development Matter?
3.1. Introduction
International ﬁnancial integration has considerably increased since the
late 1980s and 1990s, and it is considered as a source of important poten-
tial beneﬁts. First, opening to international capital markets provides ad-
ditional resources to ﬁnance investment and may therefore lead to greater
capital accumulation, especially in countries where the saving capacity is
constrained by a low level of income. In addition, ﬁnancial integration can
lead to more eﬃcient capital allocation by enhancing market discipline and
by strengthening the banking system. Together, increased capital allocation
and increased allocative eﬃciency are expected to lower the cost of invest-
ment, and hence to foster higher growth. Another major source of beneﬁts
is to facilitate international risk sharing by providing more opportunities
for portfolio diversiﬁcation. This channel provides additional means of in-
surance for ﬁrms, allowing them to invest in high-risk/high-return activities
and to fully exploit their comparative advantage by reducing production
risk induced by more specialized activities. Finally international trade in
assets should yield consumption smoothing beneﬁts by allowing risk averse
agents to better protect themselves against idiosyncratic shocks.
However, if these potential beneﬁts are well established in theory, the
empirical evidence is mixed and rather weak. While most of the empirical
literature dealing with ﬁnancial integration had focused on assessing the im-
pact of capital account openness on the growth rate (Edison et al. (2002)),
the attention has recently shifted to the relationship between ﬁnancial open-
79
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ness and macroeconomic volatility. After the ﬁnancial crisis of the 1980’s
and 1990’s which followed capital account liberalization reforms, some au-
thors have argued that ﬁnancial integration could be a source of greater
macroeconomic volatility, exposing vulnerable countries to sudden rever-
sals of capital ﬂows (Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)). According to this
line of argument, some countries may be more likely to experience higher
macroeconomic volatility, either because they lack a policy instrument to
smooth cycles, or because they lack the adequate ﬁnancial institutions to
cope with large and sudden reversals of capital ﬂows.
Even without considering extreme episodes of macroeconomic volatility
such as ﬁnancial crises, it might also be the case that ﬁnancial integration,
associated with weak domestic ﬁnancial institutions, exacerbates existing
distortions due to credit market imperfections, thus yielding higher busi-
ness cycle volatility. In the presence of informational asymmetries and/or
limited enforceability of contracts for example, capital account openness
provides additional liquidity to the domestic banking system and higher
leverage for borrowing ﬁrms. In this context, ﬁnancial integration may
amplify the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism identiﬁed by Bernanke et al.
(2000).
From a welfare perspective, there are two alternative ways to see the re-
lationship between ﬁnancial integration and macroeconomic volatility. The
ﬁrst view is that ﬁnancial integration should help countries to untie con-
sumption and output streams, allowing risk averse agents to smooth con-
sumption and leaving output volatility inconsequential for welfare. Another
way is to consider that in addition to consumption volatility, output volatil-
ity is also detrimental for welfare. Along this line, Ramey and Ramey (1995)
have shown that volatility has a detrimental impact on output growth even
after controlling for investment volatility.
Existing empirical evidence is mostly based on cross sectional analysis,
and suggests either the absence of any signiﬁcant link between ﬁnancial
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openness and macroeconomic volatility in general, or that consumption
volatility tends to increase with the degree of ﬁnancial integration for low
and middle income countries (Prasad et al. (2003)). Regarding consump-
tion growth volatility, this contradicts the idea that capital account open-
ness allows international risk sharing and consumption smoothing.
This paper is an empirical attempt to determine whether domestic ﬁ-
nancial conditions matter in the relationship between international ﬁnancial
integration and volatility. More speciﬁcally, we use a panel of 90 countries
over the period 1960-2000 to examine explicitly the role of the interaction
eﬀects between international and domestic ﬁnance in the relationship be-
tween ﬁnancial integration and volatility. We look at consumption growth
volatility to assess whether more ﬁnancially integrated countries have ex-
perienced higher degrees of consumption smoothing, and to what extent
does this depend on the level of domestic ﬁnancial development. Moreover,
since output growth volatility has been shown to have adverse eﬀects on
economic growth, we also examine whether or not ﬁnancial openness has
been associated with more volatile output growth rates.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 reviews
the related literature, section 3 presents the data and the methodology,
section 4 discusses the results and section 5 concludes.
3.2. Related Literature
3.2.1. Financial Integration and Macroeconomic Volatility. Eco-
nomic theory does not give a clear-cut prediction on the expected impact
of ﬁnancial integration on volatility. Under standard preferences, agents
are risk averse and hence trade in international assets should allow them
to smooth consumption over time. If taste shocks are important, however,
allowing for more international trade in assets would drive consumption
volatility up. For output growth volatility, the impact is also ambigu-
ous. On the one hand, opening the capital account can yield lower output
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volatility by promoting production base diversiﬁcation. On the other hand,
output volatility can rise if the consequence of ﬁnancial integration is to fa-
cilitate the exploitation of comparative advantages and to yield increasing
production specialization. To analyze this impact, most models are based
on standard two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium setups.
Their predictions vary and depend on the nature of the assumed shocks
that hit the economy (e.g. Mendoza (1994), Baxter and Crucini (1995),
and Sutherland (1996) amongst others).
Compared to the rich literature dealing with the empirical impact of
ﬁnancial integration on economic growth, the number of empirical studies
focusing on macroeconomic volatility is much more limited.
3.2.2. Empirical Evidence. Most existing empirical evidence sug-
gest the absence of a strong relationship between ﬁnancial integration and
macroeconomic volatility.
Razin and Rose (1994) assess the impact of current and of capital ac-
count openness on volatility of output, consumption and investment by
using a cross-sectional approach. They estimate the following regression
model:
ji =  + jCFCi + jKFKi + "ji
where j = Y;C;I are the variables of interest (output, consumption and
investment), and FCi (resp. FKi) is a measure of current account (resp.
capital account) openness. The main result is the absence of any signiﬁcant
relationship between openness and any of the volatility series.
Easterly et al. (2004) examine the sources of output growth volatility
for a broad sample of countries over two long periods, 1960-1978 and 1979-
1997. Using 2-period panel OLS and IV methods, they ﬁnd that trade
openness exposes a country to greater volatility, but neither the level of
private capital ﬂows, nor the volatility of these ﬂows, have a signiﬁcant
impact on output growth volatility. The level of ﬁnancial development,
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however, appears to have a signiﬁcant smoothing eﬀect on output growth,
although the impact is nonlinear. Deep ﬁnancial systems seem to reduce
volatility, but only up to a certain threshold. This threshold for private
credit is estimated to be around 100 percent of annual GDP which is rela-
tively high.
According to Sutherland’s model, ﬁnancial openness should magnify
monetary shocks and dampen budgetary shocks. Buch et al. (2002) test
Sutherland’s model by focusing on OECD countries and using annual data
from 1960 to 2000. They propose the following model:
it = 0;i + 1;t + 1
controls
it + 2FOit + uit
where it is the standard deviation of the cyclical component of real
GDP computed over 5-years time periods, and FOit is a measure of ﬁnan-
cial openness. The main result is the absence of any signiﬁcant relation-
ship between ﬁnancial openness and output volatility, supporting thus the
model’s predictions.
Kose et al. (2003) (henceforth KPT) look at the volatility of output
growth, of consumption growth and also at the relative consumption volatil-
ity (ratio of consumption volatility to output volatility), for a sample of 76
countries over the period 1960-1999. They use two indicators of ﬁnancial
openness: a dummy variable for capital account restrictions and private
capital ﬂows. The results conﬁrm the smoothing impact of ﬁnancial devel-
opment and the positive impact of trade openness on volatility. Financial
openness appears with a non signiﬁcant positive sign when regressed on
output and consumption volatility, but its impact is strongly signiﬁcant
and non linear when looking at the relative consumption volatility. These
results suggest that increasing ﬁnancial integration brings beneﬁts in terms
of consumption smoothing only beyond a certain level of ﬁnancial open-
ness (the estimated threshold for private capital ﬂows is around 49% of
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GDP). Below that level, consumption volatility is found to increase with
the degree of ﬁnancial integration. It must be noted that only some in-
dustrialized countries experience such high levels of private capital ﬂows
relative to their GDP. Since this result holds also for relative consumption
volatility, the authors argue that the positive impact of ﬁnancial integra-
tion on consumption volatility cannot be explained away by the fact that
integrated countries have experienced economic crisis.
Previous empirical studies have tried to assess the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial
conditions on volatility by looking at both domestic and external ﬁnance,
independently of each other. This paper seeks to investigate further these
links by examining explicitly the interaction eﬀects between international
ﬁnancial integration and domestic ﬁnancial development in their relation-
ship to macroeconomic volatility.
3.2.3. Financial Integration, Financial Development and Macroe-
conomic Volatility. Aghion et al. (1999) and Aghion et al. (2000) show
that economies with low level of domestic ﬁnancial development should
experience more volatile growth rates. However, Beck et al. (2001) argue
that this is not necessarily the case, and that the eﬀect of ﬁnancial devel-
opment on volatility depends on whether the economy is aﬀected by real or
monetary shocks. Using a panel of 63 countries over the period 1960-1997,
they ﬁnd no robust relationship between ﬁnancial development and output
growth volatility.
There has been a recent growing interest in analyzing the interdepen-
dence between domestic and foreign ﬁnancial markets. Chang and Velasco
(1999) examine the inﬂuence of foreign banks and foreign investors on do-
mestic banking systems, while Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) focus
on the role of the domestic ﬁnancial system to access international markets.
In Broner and Ventura (2005), domestic and foreign risk sharing are con-
nected because the government cannot discriminate between domestic and
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foreign agents. Because of this mechanism, they show that when the asset
market is incomplete due to sovereign risk, ﬁnancial globalization can lead
to losses of risk sharing opportunities both within and between countries,
and hence to losses in welfare.
Leblebicioglu (2008) analyzes formally the interaction eﬀects between
domestic credit market imperfection and ﬁnancial integration. She devel-
ops a two-country two-sector real business cycle model where one of the
countries faces asymmetric credit conditions in the sense that traded good
(T) ﬁrms have access to international ﬁnance while non traded good (NT)
ﬁrms are restricted to the imperfect domestic capital market. The credit
market imperfection in the home country comes from an assumption that
entrepreneurs in the NT sector borrow directly from workers to ﬁnance their
investment. In doing so they also face a borrowing constraint speciﬁed as
a collateral constraint. The proportion of net worth determining the maxi-
mum amount of loans is the parameter that represents the domestic credit
market imperfection. In this model, after a positive productivity shock in
the NT sector, workers want to consume more but they are also poorer be-
cause of terms of trade eﬀects. Under perfect ﬁnancial integration, workers
can borrow from the foreign country to sustain their consumption level.
Under autarchy however, the only way workers can increase their revenue
is to work more for the T sector. This worsens the terms of trade and hence
renders the home consumption bundle more expensive which then dampens
the increase in consumption. In this environment, productivity shocks in
the credit constrained NT good sector bring higher consumption volatility
and higher relative consumption volatility under ﬁnancial integration than
under ﬁnancial autarky.
In this paper, we examine empirically the interaction eﬀects between
the domestic ﬁnancial sector and international ﬁnancial integration. We
use the GMM-IV estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and
Blundell and Bond (1998) to ask (1) whether ﬁnancial integration has a
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signiﬁcant impact on macroeconomic volatility, and (2) whether this re-
lationship depends on the level of ﬁnancial development. The following
section presents the data and the methodology.
3.3. Data and Methodology
3.3.1. GMM-IV Panel Estimation Methods. The use of GMM-IV
panel methods oﬀers many advantages compared to the estimation methods
previously used in the literature, most of which are cross-section based or
rely on very short panels. First, it improves on cross-sectional analysis by
exploiting the temporal dimension of the data, and this additional source
of variability provides more degrees of freedom to estimate the parameters
of interest. Second, by estimating a ﬁxed eﬀects model, one can control
for unobserved time invariant heterogeneity in the data. Third, by using
lagged variables as instruments, GMM-IV estimators deal explicitly with
the potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables1. Fourth, this class
of estimator is consistent for large N and small T, which suits well the
structure of our sample.
We want to look at the impact of ﬁnancial integration on medium to
long term volatility, while keeping the time dimension of the dataset long
enough. Therefore, we choose to work with non-overlapping ﬁve-year pe-
riods from 1960 to 2000. This gives an unbalanced panel of 90 countries
and 8 time periods. Since there is no reason a priori to specify a dynamic
equation for macroeconomic volatility, the model is estimated both under a
static and a dynamic version. The estimation results suggest however that
past volatility is empirically relevant in explaining current volatility both
for consumption growth and output growth. The following presentation of
the regression framework is thus based on a dynamic speciﬁcation.
1The type of endogeneity that is allowed for in Arellano and Bover (1995) is one in which
a variable Xit may be correlated with current and past values of the error term vit, but
not with future realizations (weak exogeneity).
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Consider the following regression model:
yit = yit 1 + xit + i + it
with i and vit independently distributed across i, E [i] = E [vit] =
E [ivit] = 0 for i = 1;:::;N and t = 2;:::;T, and E [vitvis] = 0 8t 6= s.
With this speciﬁcation and our panel structure (long N and short T),
OLS and WITHIN estimators are biased, Maximum Likelihood estima-
tors will depend heavily on the assumed distribution for initial conditions
and the 2SLS estimator proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) lacks as-
ymptotic eﬃciency. Instead, Bond (2002), Arellano and Bond (1991) and
Arellano and Bover (1995) have proposed linear GMM-IV estimators which
are consistent and asymptotically eﬃcient under relatively weak assump-
tions. The "System-GMM" estimator developed by Arellano and Bover
(1995) consists in estimating a system of equations (one for each time pe-
riod) speciﬁed in levels and in ﬁrst diﬀerences. Adequate lagged levels of
endogenous and predetermined variables, along with contemporaneous lev-
els of strictly exogenous variables are then used as instruments for the ﬁrst
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as a weighting matrix. c vi are consistent estimates of the ﬁrst dif-
ferenced residuals obtained in a ﬁrst step. If the disturbances vit are ho-
moskedastic, then this "two-step" estimator has an asymptotically equiva-
lent "one-step" version2.
The validity of the assumed moment conditions can be tested with
Hansen’s or Sargan’s overidentifying restriction tests. Serial correlation
tests are also needed to assess the validity of the instruments.
3.3.2. Estimation strategy and Data. We consider the following
two equations for the dynamic speciﬁcation:
ijt = ijt 1 + 1Q
0
it + 2FDit + 3FIit + i + uit (3.42)
ijt = ijt 1 + 1Q
0
it + 2FDit + 4FDit  FIit + i + uit (3.43)
with i = 1;:::;N , t = 1;:::;8 and where ijt denotes the standard de-
viation of the annual growth rate of variable j = Y;C;C + G computed
over 5-years windows. We consider GDP (Y ), private consumption (C)
and total consumption (C + G). All these variables are expressed in real
per capita terms. Qit is a set of control variables, FDit is a measure of
ﬁnancial development, and FIit is a measure of ﬁnancial integration. The
parameters of interest are 2, 3, and 4 which captures the potential inter-
action eﬀect between ﬁnancial integration and ﬁnancial development. With
this formulation, we allow the impact of one of these two variables to de-
pend on the level of the other. The coeﬃcients 2 and 3 in (3.42) are the
2Simulations show that the asymptotic standard errors tend to be too small for the
"two-step" version. Windmeijer (2000) analyzes this issue and proposes ﬁnite sample
corrections for the variance.
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marginal eﬀects of, respectively, ﬁnancial development and ﬁnancial inte-
gration, unconditional on the level of the other variable. In contrast, 3 in
(3.43) represents the marginal impact of ﬁnancial integration conditional on
the level of ﬁnancial development being zero, and the analog interpretation
for 2 also holds.
The data are taken from the Penn World Tables (mark 6.1) and the
World Development Indicators3. Standard determinants of macroeconomic
volatility are included in the control set Q: we control for the volatility of
inﬂation and of terms of trade, for the degree of trade openness and also
for the share of agriculture in GDP to capture primary product depen-
dence. We also include time dummies in the regressions. Table 4 shows the
correlation matrix of the selected variables.
We use a measure of domestic credit to the private sector as a proxy
for ﬁnancial development. This is the value of credits provided by ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP. This measure of
ﬁnancial development is standard in the ﬁnance literature4, and it excludes
credit issued to the governments, to government agencies, and to public
enterprises, as well as credits provided by the central bank. While this
measure does not directly capture credit market imperfections, we can in-
terpret higher levels of domestic private credit as an indication of greater
ﬁnancial intermediary development. For ﬁnancial integration, we chose not
to use qualitative measures for two reasons. First, to the extent that they
are de jure measures, they do not necessarily capture the eﬀective exposi-
tion to capital ﬂows. Latin America for example has relatively tight capital
controls but also high levels of capital ﬂows, while on the other hand, Africa
has relatively low capital controls without experiencing high levels of capi-
tal ﬂows. The second reason is that qualitative measures do not vary over
3Complete data description is given in table 1
4See Levine et al. (2000) for a discussion on this indicator compared to alternative ones,
in a ﬁnancial development/growth context.
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time as much as quantitative measures. Among the existing de facto mea-
sures, we use the share of private gross capital ﬂow on GDP because it is
the most widely available measure in terms of period and country coverage.
Figures 1 to 3 show some basic trends in the evolution of the main vari-
ables of interest. For the whole sample5, ﬁnancial integration and ﬁnancial
development rose steadily over the period 1960-2000, with an acceleration
of ﬁnancial integration since the mid 1990’s (ﬁgure 1). On the other hand,
output growth volatility declined signiﬁcantly from 1960 to 2000, with in-
terruption periods of higher volatility, in the 1970’s and the 1990’s. Private
consumption is more volatile than output volatility over the whole sample,
but total consumption volatility is closer to output volatility, underlining
the consumption smoothing role of government expenditures.
3.4. Results
We estimate equations (3.42) and (3.43) with the "System-GMM" es-
timator described above6. Both the "one step" and "two step" versions
of the system estimator are implemented to check whether the results are
sensitive to heteroskedasticity. We focus ﬁrst on output growth volatility
and on absolute consumption growth volatility (private consumption and
total consumption). When building the instrument matrix, we treat all
explanatory variables as being potentially endogenous, with the exception
of the time dummies, the agricultural share of GDP, and the volatility of
terms of trade which we treat as strictly exogenous7 .
The estimation results are given in tables 3a to 3e. The t-statistics
are based on robust standard errors for the "one-step" version, and on
Windmeijer’s ﬁnite sample correction for the "two-step" version. Serial
correlation tests are reported in the tables to assess the validity of the
chosen instruments. No second order serial correlation is detected, so lagged
5See the country list in table 2.
6We use the xtabond2 program developed for STATA by Roodman (2006)
7Treating terms of trade volatility as endogenous did not change the results.
Hoang-Vu Eozenou, Patrick (2010), Essays on Risk-Sharing and Development 
European University Institute 
 
DOI: 10.2870/182153.4. RESULTS 91
variables of endogenous variables starting from lag t 2 and backward are
valid instruments. We choose however to be conservative in selecting the
number of variables to include in the instrument set. Roodman (2009)
shows that instrument proliferation in similar settings is a serious concern
which can undermine the standard Hansen tests for instrument validity.
Therefore, we include a subset of all valid instruments in our instrument
list which consists in only the most recent valid lag of the endogenous
variables. Moreover, we report both Hansen’s and Sargan’s tests as the
latter is less vulnerable to instrument proliferation.
We report standardized coeﬃcients8 which have the expected sign. The
lagged dependent variable coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant with mag-
nitude less than one. Given that we are considering ﬁve-year periods, this
suggests that output and consumption volatility are relatively persistent.
Moreover, this also supports the dynamic speciﬁcation adopted here. Inﬂa-
tion volatility impacts positively on output growth volatility, as do terms
of trade volatility and the share of the agricultural sector in GDP. How-
ever, these variables do not have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on consumption
growth volatility. Trade openness also appears with a positive and signiﬁ-
cant coeﬃcient, which is in line with Rodrik (1998) argument: more open
economies are more specialized and thus experience larger income shocks,
which, combined with imperfect capital markets, lead to greater macroe-
conomic volatility. This result is also consistent with the ﬁndings of Kose
et al. (2003), and Easterly et al. (2004).
The decline in output growth volatility over the sample period is better
explained by the evolution of trade openness, inﬂation, primary product
dependence and terms of trade, rather than by the ﬁnancial variables. For
output growth volatility, the ﬁnancial variables do not have any signiﬁcant
impact on volatility, regardless of whether we consider the interaction term
8The coeﬃcients are the estimated standard deviation change in the dependent variable
for one standard deviation change in the corresponding explanatory variable.
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or not. The point estimates for (3.43) suggest that ﬁnancial integration
has a positive impact on output growth volatility up to a certain level of
ﬁnancial development (around 70%-80% GDP), but the coeﬃcients are far
from being statistically signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding is consistent with previ-
ous empirical results and with most theoretical models which predict an
ambiguous impact of ﬁnancial integration on output growth volatility, de-
pending on the nature of the shocks that hit the economy. For domestic
ﬁnancial development, this result is in line with Beck et al. (2001).
We now turn to consumption volatility. When the interaction between
ﬁnancial development and ﬁnancial integration is not taken into account,
estimates of (3.42) show that the marginal impact of ﬁnancial development
on volatility is negative for private and total consumption growth volatility,
while the impact of ﬁnancial integration is positive. These coeﬃcients are
however not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 95% conﬁdence level.
In other words, taken independently of each other, domestic and external
ﬁnancial conditions do not seem to aﬀect consumption volatility. This
result contradicts the idea that allowing for more trade opportunities in
international assets should allow agents to better share risk and to smooth
their consumption plan. Although surprising, this ﬁnding is in line with
previous empirical studies that did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant relationship
between the degree of ﬁnancial integration and macroeconomic volatility.
However, if we look now at the estimates of (3.43), we see that account-
ing for the interaction term matters when evaluating the marginal impact
of ﬁnancial integration on consumption volatility. Including the interaction
term in the regression equation, the coeﬃcient of ﬁnancial integration (3)
becomes positive and strongly signiﬁcant. This means that conditional
on the level of ﬁnancial development being zero, consumption volatility
increases with the degree of ﬁnancial integration. Besides, the interaction
term (4) has a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient, suggesting that as the level
of ﬁnancial development increases, the positive impact of ﬁnancial integra-
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tion on consumption volatility looses strength. Moreover, since j4j > j3j,
there is eventually a point at which ﬁnancial development is suﬃciently
high (say FD) to allow the marginal impact of ﬁnancial integration on
consumption volatility to change sign. In other words, ﬁnancial integration
has a positive impact on consumption volatility when ﬁnancial development
is low, but when the domestic ﬁnancial system is strong enough, i.e when
FDi;t > FD, ﬁnancial integration lowers consumption volatility.
Previous empirical work seeking to assess the impact of ﬁnancial integra-
tion on macroeconomic volatility found either the absence of a robust link,
or that ﬁnancial integration impacts positively on consumption volatility.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that the impact of ﬁnancial
integration on consumption volatility depends on the level of ﬁnancial de-
velopment. Consumption volatility increases with ﬁnancial integration for
low levels of ﬁnancial development, and smoother consumption is associated
with ﬁnancial integration for high levels of ﬁnancial development. From a
policy perspective, this result suggests that reforms aiming at strengthening
the domestic ﬁnancial system should be a prerequisite to capital account
liberalization.
Computing the threshold level FD of ﬁnancial development from the
unstandardized point estimates, it appears that the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial
integration in terms of private consumption smoothing occur after ﬁnan-
cial development (i.e the GDP share of credits to the private sector) has
reached a level of about 55%-60% (see table 5). This is a relatively high
level of ﬁnancial development as only 17% of our sample (mostly indus-
trial countries) experience such levels of ﬁnancial development. We obtain
similar results after considering a static speciﬁcation of (3.42) and (3.43).
Moreover, the results do not vary much whether we consider "one-step"
or "two-step" estimation, suggesting that heteroskedasticity does not in-
ﬂuence our results. Finally, the results are robust to alternative ﬁnancial
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development indicators9.
Next, from these point estimates, we compute the total marginal eﬀect
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Both the total marginal eﬀects and their associated standard errors are
functions of FDit. Figures 4a and 5a show the estimated coeﬃcients and
their corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals for absolute and relative con-
sumption volatility. As can be seen, these conﬁdence intervals reach their
minimum value close to the estimated threshold, and they get wider as one
moves away from it. For both private and total consumption, the estimated
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly positive for low levels of ﬁnancial development,
it is close to zero for intermediate range and negative for high values of
ﬁnancial development.
Standard errors get quite large as we move away from the estimated
threshold. A possible explanation is that multicollinearity eﬀects intro-
duced by the interaction term inﬂate the variance of the estimated coeﬃ-
cients. The sample correlation coeﬃcient between ﬁnancial integration and
the interaction term (see table 5) is indeed relatively high (0.88). Mul-
ticollinearity would however only inﬂuence the precision of the estimator,
and not consistency. Hence, this potential eﬀect only strengthens our ﬁnd-
ing. Our results are conservative in the sense that even in the presence of
9Similar results are obtained with alternative indicators based on private credit (private
credit provided by the banking sector, private credit by deposit money bank), and also
with other indicators such as liquid liabilities (M3) as a % of GDP, or ﬁnancial depth
(M2) as a % of GDP.
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potentially inﬂated variances due to multicollinearity eﬀects, ﬁnancial inte-
gration remains signiﬁcantly associated with higher consumption volatility
for low levels of ﬁnancial development, and with smoother consumption
for suﬃciently developed ﬁnancial systems. Without multicollinearity ef-
fects, the conﬁdence intervals around the estimated total marginal impact
would be narrower, yielding a higher threshold level of ﬁnancial develop-
ment below which ﬁnancial integration impacts positively on consumption
volatility, and a lower threshold level of ﬁnancial development above which
ﬁnancial integration is expected to bring consumption smoothing beneﬁts.
We saw that ﬁnancial integration aﬀects consumption volatility but not
output volatility. In order to be sure that the changes in consumption
volatility are not driven by changes in output volatility we also look at
the ratio of consumption growth volatility to output growth volatility. The
results for relative consumption volatility are reported in tables 3d and
3e10 and they conﬁrm what we found for the absolute level of consumption
volatility. Financial integration has a strong positive impact on relative
consumption volatility for low levels of ﬁnancial development. Above a
threshold level of ﬁnancial development (around 65%-70% of GDP for pri-
vate consumption, see table 5), the marginal impact of ﬁnancial integration
is to reduce consumption volatility relative to output volatility.
Overall, these results suggest that for most countries in the sample the
marginal eﬀect of ﬁnancial integration is to increase absolute and relative
consumption volatility. Only a small number of countries with suﬃciently
developed ﬁnancial systems will experience consumption smoothing ben-
eﬁts from ﬁnancial integration. Looking at absolute private consumption
volatility, ﬁgure 6a shows a cross plot of ﬁnancial integration against ﬁ-
nancial development for countries with low levels of ﬁnancial development
10In contrast with output and consumption equations, serial correlation tests detect
second order serial correlation. Hence, only lags starting from t   3 and backward
provide valid instruments for the endogenous variables.
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(below 35% of GDP). These are the countries for which ﬁnancial integra-
tion is signiﬁcantly associated with more volatile consumption. Most of
the developing countries in the sample belong to this group. African coun-
tries are typically characterized by low levels of both ﬁnancial development
and ﬁnancial integration. Among these countries with low level of ﬁnancial
development, we also ﬁnd some Latin American countries with relatively
higher levels of ﬁnancial integration, and which have been subject to ﬁnan-
cial crises in the 1980’s (Mexico) and in the 1990’s (Argentina). Figure 6b
instead plots the few countries with level of ﬁnancial development above
the estimated threshold level (59%). These are the countries for which ﬁ-
nancial integration is expected to bring consumption smoothing beneﬁts.
Most of these are rich and industrialized countries.
Finally, we want to have an idea of the magnitude at which consumption
volatility responds to changes in the degree of ﬁnancial integration. We






= (3 + 4FDit)
FIit
it
These elasticities are evaluated at the mean value of ﬁnancial integration
and of ﬁnancial development over the period 1960-2000. Figures 7 and
8 show these elasticities for a selected group of countries. If we look at
countries with low level of ﬁnancial development (credit to the private sector
below 35% GDP), the elasticity of absolute private consumption volatility
ranges from 0.01% (Zimbabwe) to 0.34% (Guatemala), but most values
of the estimated elasticities lie between 0.01% and 0.1%. By contrast,
for countries with high level of development (above 59%) these elasticities
range from -0.37% (Japan) to -0.01% (Italy), with most values between
-0.2% to -0.01%.
Summarizing our ﬁndings, a ﬁrst result was that the decline in output
volatility over the sample period is better explained by the traditional in-
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dicators rather than by the ﬁnancial variables. Second, for low levels of
ﬁnancial development consumption volatility increases with ﬁnancial open-
ness, both in the absolute and relative to output volatility. However, when
the domestic ﬁnancial system is suﬃciently developed, ﬁnancial integration
yields consumption smoothing beneﬁts. The estimated threshold level of
ﬁnancial development at which the marginal impact of ﬁnancial integra-
tion on volatility changes sign is relatively high. Only 17% of the sample
at most experience consumption smoothing beneﬁts from ﬁnancial integra-
tion, most of which being industrialized countries.
3.5. Conclusion
In theory, the ability to trade internationally in assets should help risk-
averse agents to untie their consumption stream from their income stream
and thus facilitate consumption smoothing. However, recent empirical ev-
idence has suggested either the absence of a signiﬁcant correlation, or the
opposite relationship, namely that more ﬁnancially integrated countries
have experienced more volatile consumption, especially for emerging mar-
ket economies in the late 1980’s and 1990’s.
The contribution of this paper is to show that the interaction between
domestic and external market matters in assessing the relationship between
ﬁnancial integration and consumption volatility. Financial integration is
associated with higher volatility in consumption growth rates if the level
of domestic ﬁnancial development lies below a threshold level. This result
holds both for consumption in absolute terms and relative to output volatil-
ity. The threshold level of ﬁnancial development, measured by the share
of private credits to GDP, is estimated to be around 55%-60% for abso-
lute consumption volatility and around 65%-70% for relative consumption
volatility. Above this level, consumption smoothing beneﬁts are expected.
It appears however that only a limited number of industrial countries bene-
ﬁt from international ﬁnancial integration as far as consumption smoothing
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is regarded. In terms of policy, this suggests that sound domestic ﬁnancial
system should be a prerequisite to capital account liberalization reforms in
developing countries.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with some general equilibrium models with
frictions both in the domestic and in the international ﬁnancial markets
(Leblebicioglu (2008)). These results support the idea that when the do-
mestic ﬁnancial system is weak, exposition to international capital ﬂows
might exacerbate existing distortions due to capital market imperfections,
and hence amplify economic ﬂuctuations. An other interpretation goes
along the lines of Broner and Ventura (2005) in the sense that rising ﬁ-
nancial globalization can be associated with the destruction of risk sharing
opportunities when asset markets are incomplete.
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Table 1: Sample Size and Pre-Transfer Income.
Variable name and description Source
Output Summers and Heston PWT 6.1
Real GDP per capita (Constant price: Laspeyres) series code: RGDPL
Private Consumption Summers and Heston PWT 6.1
Consumption Share of RGDPL series code: KC
Government Consumption Summers and Heston PWT 6.1
Government Share of RGDPL series code: KG
Inﬂation World Bank WDI
log(1+inﬂation), GDP deﬂator (annual %) series code: NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG
Terms of Trade World Bank WDI
Net Barter ToT (1995 = 100) series code: TT.PRI.MRCH.XD.WD
Agriculture World Bank WDI
Value added of the agricultural sector in % of GDP series code: NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS
Trade Openness World Bank WDI
Value of imports and exports in % of GDP series code: NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS
Financial Development World Bank WDI
Domestic credit to the private sector in % of GDP series code: FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS
Financial integration World Bank WDI
Gross private capital ﬂows in % of GDP series code: BG.KAC.FNEI.GD.ZS
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Table 2: Country List. Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium,
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Rep.), Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon,
Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong SAR, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mau-
ritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pak-
istan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singa-
pore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uganda, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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Table 3a: Estimation Results.
Dependent: Output Growth Volatility
Standardized Coeﬃcients One-Step System Two-Step System

























Financial Development (FD) -.005 (.12) -.0006 (.01) -.004 (.09) .003 (.09)
Financial Integration (FI) .018 (.76) .019 (.22) .024 (.98) .047 (.70)
FD*FI -.020 (.16) -.054 (.54)
Sargan test (p-value) .589 .975 .289 .627
Hansen test (p-value) .933 .972 .782 .849
AR(1) test (p-value) .041 .043 .069 .075
AR(2) test (p-value) .348 .348 .400 .410
AR(3) test (p-value) .381 .395 .426 .454
t-statistics in parentheses, Windmeijer correction in “Two Step System”
(), () and () denote coeﬃcient diﬀerent from zero at 90%, 95% and 99% conﬁdence level
Time dummies are included but not reported
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Table 3b: Estimation Results.
Dependent: Private Consumption Growth Volatility
Standardized Coeﬃcients One-Step System Two-Step System





Inﬂation Volatility .053 (.60) .038 (.44) .041 (.46) .039 (.42)
Terms of Trade Volatility .099 (1.38) .085 (1.29) .099 (1.34)
 .081 (1.14)
Agriculture Share .020 (.32) .016 (.27) .016 (.25) .023 (.40)





Financial Development (FD) -.094 (1.51) -.033 (.64) -.091 (1.36) .003 (.09)
Financial Integration (FI) .030 (.62) .244 (2.16)





Sargan test (p-value) .886 .927 .530 .706
Hansen test (p-value) .971 .988 .791 .967
AR(1) test (p-value) .002 .002 .007 .007
AR(2) test (p-value) .406 .331 .432 .364
AR(3) test (p-value) .403 .415 .472 .466
t-statistics in parentheses, Windmeijer correction in “Two Step System”
(), () and () denote coeﬃcient diﬀerent from zero at 90%, 95% and 99% conﬁdence level
Time dummies are included but not reported
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Table 3c: Estimation Results.
Dependent: Total Consumption Growth Volatility
Standardized Coeﬃcients One-Step System Two-Step System










Terms of Trade Volatility .091 (1.23) .079 (1.13) .096 (1.20) .092 (1.18)









Financial Development (FD) -.083 (1.51) -.016 (.30) -.079 (2.27)
 -.029 (.62)
Financial Integration (FI) .043 (.72) .287 (2.27)





Sargan test (p-value) .885 .926 .526 .704
Hansen test (p-value) .409 .555 .833 .986
AR(1) test (p-value) .000 .001 .002 .002
AR(2) test (p-value) .190 .036 .268 .376
AR(3) test (p-value) .608 .657 .642 .823
t-statistics in parentheses, Windmeijer correction in “Two Step System”
(), () and () denote coeﬃcient diﬀerent from zero at 90%, 95% and 99% conﬁdence level
Time dummies are included but not reported
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Table 3d: Estimation Results.
Dependent: Relative Consumption Volatility (private)
Standardized Coeﬃcients One-Step System Two-Step System
Lagged Dependent Variable .132 (.87) .081 (.76) .118 (.73)
 .075 (.64)
Inﬂation Volatility .011 (.06) .020 (.13) -.021 (.15) -.001 (.01)
Terms of Trade Volatility .023 (.44) .000 (.02) .010 (.26) -.002 (.05)
Agriculture Share .073 (.92) .075 (.95) .069 (.91) .067 (.72)





Financial Development (FD) .038 (.42) .126 (.139) .048 (.39) .141 (1.49)
Financial Integration (FI) .004 (.08) .336 (2.46)





Sargan test (p-value) .947 .821 .453 .382
Hansen test (p-value) .319 .332 .441 .521
AR(1) test (p-value) .000 .001 .056 .032
AR(2) test (p-value) .044 .033 .175 .118
AR(3) test (p-value) .225 .366 .330 .442
t-statistics in parentheses, Windmeijer correction in “Two Step System”
(), () and () denote coeﬃcient diﬀerent from zero at 90%, 95% and 99% conﬁdence level
Time dummies are included but not reported
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Table 3e: Estimation Results.
Dependent: Relative Consumption Volatility (total)
Standardized Coeﬃcients One-Step System Two-Step System





Inﬂation Volatility -.006 (.06) -.006 (.07) .017 (.36) -.035 (.58)

Terms of Trade Volatility -.004 (.10) -.026 (.62) -.019 (.35) -.016 (.32)
Agriculture Share .149 (1.90)
 .173 (2.26)
 .126 (1.50) .147 (1.88)






Financial Development (FD) -.041 (.61) .076 (1.28) -.054 (.82) .049 (.71)

Financial Integration (FI) .010 (.16) .476 (3.09)
 .009 (.14) .447 (2.58)

FD*FI -.564 (3.42) -.474 (2.35)

Sargan test (p-value) .243 .421 .241 .420
Hansen test (p-value) .320 .333 .444 .524
AR(1) test (p-value) .000 .001 .003 .003
AR(2) test (p-value) .019 .036 .023 .028
AR(3) test (p-value) .339 .657 .369 .588
t-statistics in parentheses, Windmeijer correction in “Two Step System”
(), () and () denote coeﬃcient diﬀerent from zero at 90%, 95% and 99% conﬁdence level
Time dummies are included but not reported
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix.
Vol(Y) Vol(C) Vol(inf) Vol(ToT) Agric. Open. FD FI FI*FD
Vol(Y) 1.00
Vol(C) .5593 1.00
Vol(inf) .3004 .2381 1.00
Vol(ToT) .3615 .2159 .1574 1.00
Agric. .2897 .1514 .1279 .3000 1.00
Open. .1455 .2355 .0566 -.0442 -.1592 1.00
FD -.3581 -.2876 -.1872 -.3119 -.5994 .0410 1.00
FI -.0121 .0464 .0335 -.0776 -.2242 .3332 .2535 1.00
FI*FD -.1073 -.0494 -.0191 -.01404 -.2683 .3609 .4609 .8844 1.00
Table 5: Estimated Thresholds of Financial Development
(private credit in % of GDP).
Point estimates for the threshold level of FD at which
the marginal eﬀect of FI on volatility changes sign





Dynamic speciﬁcation, one-step 58.9 66.5 67.7 71.8
Dynamic speciﬁcation, two-steps 58.4 67.8 68.9 80.2
Static speciﬁcation, one-step 54.9 64.3 67.0 67.8
Static speciﬁcation, two-steps 55.2 65.1 66.8 67.5
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1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
5−years period average
Financial integration Financial development
Financial integration is measured by gross private capital flows in %GDP (source: WDI).
Financial development is measured by credits to the private sector in %GDP (source: WDI).
Evolution for the whole sample over 1960−2000
(Fig.1) Financial Integration and Financial Development




































































































































5% 28.4% (med) 155%
FD (Private credit in % GDP)
Linear fit
(Variables are plotted in log)
Over 1960−2000
(Fig.2) Financial Integration and Financial Development

























1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
5−years period average
Output growth volatility Private consumption growth volatility
Total consumption growth volatility
Volatility is the standard deviation of a given variable’s annual growth rate over 5−years (non overlapping) periods.
Evolution for the whole sample over 1960−2000
(Fig.3) Volatility
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0 .35 .59 .83 1 1.5 2
Financial development (private credit in %GDP)
95% Confidence Interval Estimated Coefficient
One−step estimates, overlaid with histogram of FD
Overall impact of FI is positive for levels of private credit below 35%
and it is negative above 83% GDP
Dependent: Private consumption growth volatility







































































0 .35 .83 1 1.5 2
Financial development (private credit in % GDP)
| t−stat |
Dynamic model, One−step estimates
Overlaid with histogram of FD
Dependent: Private consumption growth volatility
(Fig.4b) | t−stat | of FI Coefficient at Different Levels of FD, Dynamic Model
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0 .27 .68 1.1 1.5 2
Financial development (private credit in %GDP)
95% Confidence Interval Estimated Coefficient
One−step estimates, overlaid with histogram of FD
Overall impact of FI is positive for levels of private credit below 27%
and it is negative above 110% GDP
Dependent: Relative private consumption growth volatility







































































0 .27 1.1 1.5 2
Financial development (private credit in % GDP)
| t−stat |
Dynamic model, One−step estimates
Overlaid with histogram of FD
Dependent: Relative private consumption growth volatility
(Fig.5b) | t−stat | of FI Coefficient at Different Levels of FD, Dynamic Model
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5% 18.3% (med) 35%
FD (Private credit in % GDP)
Countries with level of FD below 35% GDP are countries for which the overall effect of FI
on absolute private consumption volatility is positive.
(Variables are plotted in log)
Countries for which FI is associated with higher volatility in absolute private consumption




































































59.5% 78.8% (med) 141%
FD (Private credit in % GDP)
Countries with level of FD above 59% GDP are countries for which the overall effect of FI
on absolute private consumption volatility is likely to be negative.
Given their already high level of FI, Singapore and Hong Kong are not plotted
Countries for which FI is associated with lower volatility in absolute private consumption
(Fig.6b) Financial Integration and Financial Development
High FD countries
Hoang-Vu Eozenou, Patrick (2010), Essays on Risk-Sharing and Development 
European University Institute 
 
DOI: 10.2870/18215FIGURES 111
Figures 7 and 8: FI Elasticity of Private Consumption Volatil-
ity.
−0.4% −0.3% −0.2% −0.1% 0 0.1%












































Two groups of countries are included:
Countries with level of FD below 35% GDP and above the point estimate of the treshold level of FD (59%).
Hong Kong and Singapore have been dropped.
Selected group of countries from regression sample (1/2)
(Fig.7a) FI−Elasticity of Absolute Consumption Volatility
0 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4%







































Two groups of countries are included:
Countries with level of FD below 35% GDP and above the point estimate of the treshold level of FD (59%).
Hong Kong and Singapore have been dropped.
Selected group of countries from regression sample (2/2)
(Fig.7b) FI−Elasticity of Absolute Private Consumption Volatility
−0.4% −0.3% −0.2% −0.1% 0

















Countries with level of FD above the point estimate of the treshold level of FD (59%).
Germany, Austria, Portugal and Malaysia are out of the regression sample
Hong Kong, and Singapore have been dropped.
Countries for which FI lowers consumption volatility
(Fig.8) FI−Elasticity of Absolute Consumption Volatility
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